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Constitutionally Different:
A Child’s Right to Substantive Due Process
Tiffani N. Darden*
Kent v. United States required trial courts to conduct an individualized
assessment before transferring a juvenile defendant to criminal jurisdiction.
Several decades later, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court prohibited
imposing life without parole sentences upon youth offenders without first
conducting an individualized assessment. The latter holding also
pronounced that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults, finding
support in social science, developmental psychology and neuroscience
advancements. This same body of adolescent behavioral research casts
fundamental fairness concerns on a transferred youth’s ability to effectively
participate in other parts of the justice process when removed to criminal
court.
Whereas due process and the Eighth Amendment have fully draped
constitutional juvenile issues to date, my Article proposes that substantive
due process more aptly secures a youth offender’s liberty interests when
battling disadvantages attributable to their youthfulness traits as
experienced throughout the entire justice process—from adequate
representation, to transfer, to trial participation, to the sentencing phase. At
present, fourteen states absolutely deprive juveniles of an individualized
assessment at any juncture in the justice process, including at the initial
jurisdictional transfer determination. This Article contributes the first
holistic analysis for recognizing the constitutional difference between
juveniles and their adult counterparts at critical adjudicatory points, not
only at transfer or the sentencing stage, through a substantive due process
framework.
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INTRODUCTION
The phrase “juveniles are constitutionally different from adults” means
something more than prohibiting the death penalty and life-withoutparole sentences for youth offenders.1 Many juvenile sentencing cases
rest on this commonsense observation affirmed through social science,
developmental psychology, and neuroscience.2 But when juveniles find
1. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
2. Many amicus briefs have been filed in the Supreme Court citing such studies. See, e.g., Brief
for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13–
24, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for the APA in Miller] (arguing
developmental neuroscience research supports that both the structure of the adolescent brain, and
the way it functions, are immature compared to the adult brain); Brief for the American Medical
Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 4–30, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief
for the AMA in Miller] (arguing that juveniles have less “voluntary control of behavior” than adults
and that there is a biological basis for their behavioral immaturities); Brief for the American
Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6–27, Graham, 560 U.S.
48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for the APA in Graham] (arguing that developmental
psychology and neuroscience research supports that juveniles are more immature, vulnerable, and
changeable than adults); Brief for the American Medical Association and the American Academy
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4–30, Graham,
560 U.S. 48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) (arguing, as they did in Miller, that juveniles have less
voluntary control over their behavior than adults and that there is a biological basis for their
behavioral immaturities); Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the Missouri
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themselves in criminal court, constitutional fundamental fairness
demands that the entire justice process—not merely sentencing—must be
adjusted to accommodate their maturity deficiencies.3
Upon transfer to criminal jurisdiction, a juvenile typically receives
treatment equal to their adult counterparts, except under limited
circumstances at the sentencing stage. The juvenile court to criminal
court transfer mechanism dates back to the inception of juvenile courts.4
But juvenile offenders’ lack of developmental maturity makes them
uniquely vulnerable throughout the justice process for the same reasons
undergirding juvenile sentencing reform.5 The state maintains full
authority to transfer a juvenile to criminal jurisdiction, but substantive
due process commands that affirmative rights be given to these juvenile
defendants to ensure fairness when the risk involves loss of liberty.6
Identifying these critical stages and providing an individualized
assessment for transferred youth offenders aligns with political history

Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4–13, Roper, 543 U.S. 551
(No. 03-633) (arguing that adolescents think and behave differently from adults, emphasizing that
they engage in more risk-taking, do not properly consider consequences, and their brains are not
fully developed); Brief of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 8–11, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (emphasizing research illustrating
juveniles’ mental deficiencies); Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 4–20, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (arguing that adolescents at
age sixteen and seventeen think and behave differently from adults, emphasizing that they engage
in more risk-taking, do not properly consider consequences, and their brains are not fully
developed).
3. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (“We have tried . . . to strike a balance—to
respect the ‘informality’ and ‘flexibility’ that characterize juvenile proceedings, and yet to ensure
that such proceedings comport with ‘fundamental fairness’ demanded by the Due Process Clause.”
(citation omitted)); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 540 (1975) (reiterating the goal that “to the extent
fundamental fairness permits, adjudicatory hearings [should] be informal and nonadversary”);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (emphasizing the factfinding procedures
required to satisfy fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that using the same evidentiary standard in juvenile justice
cases as in civil cases “amount[s] to a lack of fundamental fairness”); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–
31 (1967) (“[W]e do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.”).
4. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 13, 13–14 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds. 2000) (“[T]he history of transfer
reveals a diversity of practices, which emerged in the years between the establishment of the
nation’s first juvenile court in 1899 and the Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the
constitutionality of transfer in Kent v. United States.”).
5. See infra notes 156–158 (explaining the Court’s designation of “youthful traits”); see
generally supra note 2 (stating that juveniles are “constitutionally different than adults” based on
developmental psychology and research).
6. See infra Part II.
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and Supreme Court constitutional trends.
Kent v. United States and Montgomery v. Louisiana form long fought
bookends to the treatment of juvenile offenders.7 In 1966, the Kent Court
reaffirmed the original motivations behind establishing juvenile courts by
articulating procedural requirements for the discretionary transfer of
youth offenders to criminal jurisdiction.8 Fast-forward to Miller v.
Alabama, decided in 2012, which prohibited sentencing juvenile
offenders under mandatory life-without-parole statutes.9 Under Miller,
now retroactively applied through Montgomery, the Supreme Court
demonstrated its reliance on expert opinions in adolescent development
to assist in setting constitutional boundaries for the treatment of juvenile
offenders.10 The Kent and Miller Courts suggested individualized factors
for trial courts to consider when making decisions about transfer and
sentencing.11 In light of Miller, Montgomery, decided in 2016, noted that,
because “children are constitutionally different from adults,” they “must
be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable
corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside
prison walls must be restored.”12
State supreme courts often bifurcate transfer and sentencing issues:
transfer from juvenile to criminal court receives a procedural due process
analysis, while sentencing invokes Eighth Amendment issues. In this
Article, I posit that the Supreme Court’s more recent juveniles “are
different from adults” designation creates a substantive due process right
that is not limited to Eighth Amendment sentencing issues but rather
spans the entire justice process.13 The same adolescent developmental

7. See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718 (2016).
8. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (“[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, without a statement of reasons.”).
9. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
10. Id. at 488 (“[B]y [the transfer hearing] the expert’s testimony could not change the sentence;
whatever she said in mitigation, the mandatory life-without-parole prison term would kick in.”).
11. See id. at 480 (“[W]e require [the sentencer] to take into account how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”);
Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–68 (listing eight factors for a judge to consider when deciding whether the
juvenile will be transferred to criminal court. These include, for example, “[t]he seriousness of the
alleged offense to the community . . .” and “[t]he sophistication and maturity of the juvenile . . . .”).
12. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736–37.
13. Id. at 736 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Miller, 567 U.S. 460).

2018]

Constitutionally Different

215

research that the courts relied on to reform sentencing norms has also
been used to identify other stages in the adjudication process wherein
youth offenders may work at a disadvantage to their adult counterparts,
calling into question constitutional fundamental fairness concerns.14 For
example, the adult competency standard applied may not encompass a
juvenile immaturity evaluation. This distinction calls into question
juvenile defendants’ ability to understand their basic rights and
effectively participate in their criminal trials. Youthfulness may also
lessen a child’s ability to adequately assist counsel. Merging the lessons
from Kent and Miller inevitably leads to the conclusion that a juvenile’s
immaturity deficits should be assessed at every critical juncture in the
justice process, starting with transfer and extending to all mandatory
sentencing statutes.
The Supreme Court’s categorization of children as constitutionally
different from adults recognizes a salient concept that should affect any
contact a minor may have with the criminal courts.15 This is a substantive
due process right requiring affirmative action from states that transfer
jurisdiction for those accused while under eighteen years old to adult
courts. All fifty states exercise the right to remove children from juvenile
jurisdiction,16 but fourteen states currently administer wholly
unconstitutional systems. In these states, there is no juncture at which a
juvenile receives an individualized assessment before or during
sentencing. This is an unconstitutional “absolute deprivation”
considering their age status.17
The individualized assessment oversight should begin when the state
seeks to transfer a juvenile to criminal jurisdiction. Only six states place
the transfer from juvenile to criminal court solely in the discretion of
juvenile court judges, who, by constitutional requirement, must make an
individualized assessment: Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Tennessee,
and Texas.18 Juveniles may also find themselves in a criminal court
14. See supra note 2; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–34 (1967); see generally Emily Buss, The
Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39 (2003) (discussing Gault’s implications).
15. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Miller,
567 U.S. 460).
16. PATRICK GRIFFIN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 2 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/232434.pdf.
17. NAT’L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: AN UPDATED
ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REFORM 7 (2008), http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/MFC/MFC_Transfer_2008.pdf.
18. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-22(a) (2018) (“The court may waive jurisdiction and order a
minor . . . held for criminal proceedings after full investigation and hearing where the person . . . is
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through mandatory judicial waiver, prosecutorial direct file, or statutory
exclusion. Six states require mandatory judicial waiver without the safety
valve of reverse waiver or criminal blended sentencing.19 Two states
permit prosecutorial discretion with no provisions for reverse waiver or
criminal blended sentencing.20 And finally, seven state legislatures have
enacted statutory exclusions to juvenile jurisdiction without an option for
reverse waiver or criminal blended sentencing when the juvenile
defendant comes before the court.21 State supreme courts have wholly
alleged to have committed an act that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult . . . .”);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2018) (“[T]he county or district attorney[] . . . may file a motion
requesting that the court authorize prosecution of the juvenile as an adult under the applicable
criminal statute. The juvenile shall be presumed to be a juvenile, and the presumption must be
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”); ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(A) (2018) (“When a
petition alleges that a juvenile committed an act which would be murder or a Class A, B or C crime
if committed by adult, the court shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney, continue the case
for further investigation and for a bind-over hearing to determine whether the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court over the juvenile should be waived.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (2018) (“If a
petition alleges that a child between the ages of twelve and seventeen has committed an offense
which would be considered a felony if committed by an adult, the court may, upon . . . motion . . .
order a hearing and may, in its discretion, dismiss the petition and such child may be
transferred . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(a)(2) (2018) (requiring “[a] hearing on whether
the transfer should be made”); TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(c) (2017) (“The juvenile court shall
conduct a hearing without a jury to consider transfer of the child for criminal proceedings.”).
19. See IND. CODE § 31-30-3-6 (2018) (“Upon motion by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile
court shall waive jurisdiction if” the child is charged with a felony, or the child has previously been
charged with a nontraffic misdemeanor or felony.); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A) (2017)
(explaining that mandatory waiver is required for those age fifteen and older charged with first or
second degree murder, first degree rape, or aggravated kidnapping); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B2200 (2017) (“If the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and the court finds probable cause,
the court shall transfer the case to the superior court for trial as in the case of adults.”); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-20-34(1)(b) (2015) (requiring judicial transfer of children over fourteen years old if it
“determines that there is probable cause to believe the child committed . . . the offense of murder
or attempted murder; gross sexual imposition or the attempted gross sexual imposition of a victim
by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping . . . .”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4A-26.1(c) (West 2018) (“[T]he court shall waive jurisdiction of a juvenile delinquency
case without the juvenile’s consent and shall refer the case to the appropriate court and prosecuting
authority if” the juvenile is fifteen or older and is charged with one of the specified crimes); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.10, 2152.12 (West 2018) (stating circumstances in which a child sixteen
or older is eligible for mandatory transfer in certain circumstances); 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3
(2018).
20. See D.C. CODE § 16-2307(a) (2018); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(1)(b) (2018).
21. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-204(a)(1)–(7) (2018) (listing crimes for which those over the age
of sixteen are automatically charged as adults); IND. CODE § 31-30-1-4(a)(1)–(10) (2018) (listing
crimes for which those between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are charged automatically as
adults); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A)(1)–(2) (2018) (excluding those aged fifteen and older
from juvenile jurisdiction after certain procedures are followed and the person is charged with first
or second degree murder, “aggravated or first degree rape, or aggravated kidnapping”); MINN.
STAT. § 260B.007(6)(b) (2018) (excepting from the definition of “delinquent child,” a child who
is charged with first degree murder over the age of sixteen); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2018)
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supported these methods based on various constitutional arguments.22
Once transferred under these automatic transfer provisions, Miller
comes into play to require an individualized assessment at the sentencing
stage.23 The Miller Court’s holding should not only work to determine
the appropriateness of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. An
individualized assessment should also be required to apply any
mandatory minimum sentence provisions applied to juveniles.
Accordingly, the constitutionality determination should be adjusted to
focus on the defendant’s age and whether the state provided an effective
individualized assessment at either the transfer or sentencing stage.
Furthermore, I argue, a substantive due process right holds states
responsible for effective participation throughout the justice process
when youthful immaturity presents as the “Achilles heel” to fundamental
fairness principles.
In this Article, I will move along considering the full meaning of the
phrase “juveniles are constitutionally different” and its implications
across the whole justice process.24 That juveniles are constitutionally
different from adults cannot hold meaning in only the three already
recognized instances: death penalty, mandatory life without parole, and
non-homicide offenses.25 Based on the same evidence supporting these
Supreme Court holdings, we know that transfer to adult court creates
problematic constitutional questions long before the courts attempt to
sentence the worst among youthful offenders.26 Therefore, we must flesh
out what this slow, twenty-year constitutional epiphany means to the
middle, not just along the edges.

(excepting from the terms “Child” or “Juvenile” those who are charged with a Class A, B, C, or D
felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-701(1) (West 2018) (“The district court has exclusive
jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged with an offense that would be murder
or aggravated murder if committed by an adult.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A)–(C)
(2018) (excepting from juvenile jurisdiction sixteen or seventeen year olds charged with serious
violent offenses, certain other violent offenses, or rape of a child in the first degree).
22. See, e.g., State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1998); People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526
(Ill. 2014); State v. Hall, 350 So. 2d 141 (La. 1977); Commonwealth v. Wayne W., 606 N.E.2d
1323 (Mass. 1993); State v. Angilau, 245 P.3d 745 (Utah 2011).
23. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
24. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller, 567 U.S. 460).
25. See generally Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (relating to mandatory sentencing schemes imposing life
without parole statutes upon juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without parole
sentences for non-homicide offenses); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (barring death penalty for juveniles).
26. See supra note 2.
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Part I reviews the Supreme Court’s sentencing cases that define
juveniles as constitutionally different from their adult counterparts.27
These pronouncements find their justification in social science,
developmental psychology, and advancements in neuroscience, which
together inform more than culpability.28 This research also gives insight
into a juvenile defendant’s ability to effectively participate in the justice
process once transferred to adult jurisdiction.29 In Part II, I propose that
substantive due process provides a constitutional doctrine to protect
youth, based on their age status, when removed from juvenile jurisdiction
to criminal court.30 This argument extends the Supreme Court’s
reasoning from the sentencing stage to other critical stages wherein a
juvenile defendant’s youthfulness traits make them uniquely
vulnerable.31 Part III illustrates how juveniles are shuttled through the
adult justice system with no individualized assessment at any critical
juncture in the process.32 The discussion addresses those states that
absolutely deprive juvenile defendants of any status recognition once
transferred to criminal court.33 Finally, Part IV analyzes the transfer
process in depth.34 This deliberation details jurisdictional transfer
mechanisms that consider an individualized assessment and alternative
transfer methods that forgo such considerations.35 In conclusion, the
system of statutorily converting juvenile delinquents into criminal

27. See infra Part I.
28. See, e.g., Brief for the APA in Miller, supra note 2, at 25–26 (citing Laurence Steinberg,
Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009)) (stating “By now, ‘[t]here is incontrovertible evidence of
significant changes in brain structure and function during adolescence,’” and noting that brain
structures that are essential to “planning, motivation, judgment, and decision-making . . .” are
developed during adolescence); Brief for the AMA in Miller, supra note 2, at 7–10 (“Scientists
have identified various interrelated immaturities in adolescents’ self-regulatory abilities that
contribute to their limitation in controlling their impulses and their greater tendency to engage in
risky or reckless behavior.”); Brief for the APA in Graham, supra note 2, at 16 (citing Margo
Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision
Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
625, 626–34 (2005), and explaining that a study “found that exposure to peers during a risk-taking
task doubled the amount of risky behavior among mid-adolescents (with a mean age of 14),
increased it by 50 percent among college undergraduates (with a mean age of 19), and had no
impact at all among young adults.”).
29. See supra note 28.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. Infra Part III.
34. Infra Part IV.
35. Infra Part IV.
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defendants requires that their youthfulness traits be weighed long before
reaching the fateful sentencing stage, based on a substantive due process
right that permeates the justice process.
I. VALIDATING THAT CHILDREN ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY DIFFERENT
FROM ADULTS
The juvenile sentencing trilogy sets forth categorical bans for juvenile
offenders, those under the age of eighteen years old at the time of their
alleged criminal act: Roper v. Simmons prohibited the death penalty,
Graham v. Florida prohibited life without parole for those committing
non-homicide offenses, and Miller v. Alabama prohibited applying
mandatory life-without-parole sentencing statutes.36 Importantly, in
Roper, the Supreme Court relied on social science, developmental
psychology and neuroscience to augment the commonsense reasoning it
used to support previous age-based holdings.37
Roper v. Simmons marked a continuation in the Supreme Court’s
attempt to articulate the role of age when imposing the death penalty. 38
The constitutional difference between adults and juveniles rests on
evidence-based conclusions that youth possess a diminished culpability,
such that conventional penological justifications prove impertinent in this
context.39 First, a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”40 Second,
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure. . . .This is explained in part by
36. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 576 U.S. 460 (2012).
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–75.
38. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (finding it unconstitutional to impose capital punishment
for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
367 (1993) (“A sentence in a capital case must be allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of
youth in the course of its deliberations over the appropriate sentence.”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 405 (1989) (finding that “the execution of juvenile offenders violates contemporary
standards of decency”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (reiterating that “the
Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed
by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is
too obvious to require extended explanation.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)
(holding youth to be a necessary mitigating factor in death penalty cases, characterizing youth as
“more than a chronological fact,” but as a “time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage”).
39. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–75.
40. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
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the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less
experience with control, over their own environment.”41 And third, “the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” 42
According to the Roper Court, juveniles’ lack of maturity explains that
“their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.”43 Additionally, juveniles’ “vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings” lessens the expectation and
responsibility to remove themselves from a harmful situation.44 And
finally, a juvenile’s amorphous self-constitution tamps down the validity
of any definitive determinations that “even a heinous crime committed
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”45 The
Graham majority echoed Roper’s acceptance of the constitutional
difference between juveniles and adults, stating that “developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds.”46
After Graham, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court addressed
whether a Miranda custody determination must consider the juvenile
suspect’s age.47 The Court reached back to its older juvenile-related
holdings leaning on common sense to decide that children should not be
held to the same standard as adults.48 In this context, the Supreme Court
opined that
officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of
developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise
in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They
simply need the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13year-old and neither is an adult.49

Only one year later, the Supreme Court returned to external experts to

41. Id. (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115).
42. Id. at 570.
43. Id. (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).
44. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
45. Id.
46. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
47. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011); see Roper, 543 U.S. 551. See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that law
enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during
interrogations while in police custody).
48. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 262 (“In the specific context of police interrogation, events that ‘would
leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm’ a teen.” (quoting Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948))).
49. Id. at 279–80.
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uphold constitutional sentencing boundaries for juveniles.50 Of
significance, Miller introduced the procedural requirement of an
individualized assessment to accompany the prohibition against applying
mandatory life-without-parole statutes to juvenile defendants in criminal
court.51 Thereafter, Montgomery v. Louisiana labeled the new rule to be
a substantive change of law duly implemented through procedure.52
Under a dimmer spotlight, the Montgomery Court rejected the state’s
argument that the individualized assessment conducted at the transfer
stage substitutes for an individualized assessment at the sentencing
stage.53
In Miller, the two cases under review involved fourteen-year-old
defendants prosecuted in adult criminal courts based on transfer statutes
controlled by prosecutorial discretion.54 The Court addressed the
constitutionality of mandatory life without the possibility of parole
statutes as applied to juvenile offenders.55 The Court relied on two sets
of sentencing cases to determine the sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional: categorical bans based on disproportionality between
the defendant’s characteristics and the offense committed and prohibition
against imposing the death penalty without an individualized
consideration of the defendant’s characteristics.56 With these precedents
in mind, the Court reiterated Roper’s core reasoning and Graham, which
“establish[ed] that children are constitutionally different from adults for
sentencing purposes.”57 The Miller Court laid bare the intersection
between youth and sentencing as follows:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of
his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home
environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects
the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may
50. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
51. Id.
52. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
53. Id. at 734–35.
54. Miller, 567 U.S. at 466, 468–69 (describing the Arkansas and Alabama statutes permitting
transfer of the juvenile defendants to adult criminal court, both under prosecutorial discretion).
55. Id. at 465.
56. Id. at 470.
57. Id. at 461 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68 (2010)).
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have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist
his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards
the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most
suggest it.58

Although the Court did not remove life without parole as a sentencing
option for juveniles, Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, predicted
that in light of the sentencing trilogy’s statements on “children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, . . .
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible
penalty will be uncommon.”59
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court granted retroactive application for
its ban against sentencing juveniles under mandatory life-without-parole
statutes.60 The Court’s explanation for why Miller constituted a new
substantive rule, not merely a procedural change, helps clarify the
interplay between an offender’s age and the sentencing determination.61
The Court stated that:
A hearing where “youth and its attendant characteristics” are considered
as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may
be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not. The hearing
does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding
that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose
crimes reflect transient immaturity.62

At first blush, it seems that the sentence length dictates the need for an
individualized assessment. The Court made it clear that the Eighth
Amendment violation is sentencing a juvenile to life without parole,
except in the rarest of circumstances; only through an individualized
assessment may courts avoid imposing such a disproportionate
punishment.63 Montgomery reminded us that Miller not only required
trial courts to consider the offender’s age, but also went further to
58. Id. at 477–78 (citations omitted) (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011);
Graham, 560 U.S. at 78).
59. Id. at 479.
60. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016).
61. “Protection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the
Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at
732–33.
62. Id. at 735 (citations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465).
63. “Miller did bar life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. . . . Before Miller, every juvenile convicted of a homicide
offense could be sentenced to life without parole.” Id. at 734.
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“establish[] that the penological justifications for life without parole
collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’”64
Constitutional procedures erected at the outcome stage do not clear the
state’s conscience. With the parens patriae duty now fermented into
constitutional law, policymakers must address the juvenile defendant’s
ability to fairly fight at the stages leading up to a sentencing hearing. 65
The Supreme Court reflected on a collection of youthfulness traits to
conclude that juvenile offenders possess a lesser culpability as compared
to adults, which led to tangible results in the sentencing context.66 The
question remains as to what other tangible results may be gained through
the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that juveniles are constitutionally
different from adults according to evidence-based traits of youthfulness.
Individualized assessment tailored to the adjudicatory stage may be
required to protect the substantive rights these differences create.
II. MOLDING A JUSTICE PROCESS FOR JUVENILES OFFENDERS
The Court’s initial interventions with administering justice for
juveniles came down as fundamental fairness holdings, grounded in due
process, and meant to restrain juvenile courts.67 In the criminal context,
the Court has embraced the juvenile court’s recognition that children are
different from adults by articulating custodial rights under the Fourth
Amendment and sentencing rights under the Eighth Amendment.68 The
juvenile sentencing cases Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
significantly changed how the constitutional standards applied to youth
offenders.69 These cases prohibited states from executing juveniles,
imposing sentence of life without parole for those juveniles convicted of
non-homicide offenses, and applying mandatory life-without-parole
64. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).
65. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 69–
70 (2008) (“[T]he state’s parens patriae authority is invoked when the government acts on the basis
of society’s moral obligation to care for its weak and dependent members; here, the focus is on the
interest and welfare of individual children affected by the regulation.”).
66. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (Explaining that children’s “lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” vulnerability “to negative influences and outside
pressures,” and character that is “not as well formed as an adult’s” makes children less culpable
than adults (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 460, 471)).
67. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1975);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller,
567 U.S. at 479; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
69. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Miller, 567 U.S. 460;
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718.
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statutes to juveniles.70 The Court’s prospective impact on juvenile
sentencing appears clear cut, but the reverberation of its rulings
throughout the justice process is much less straightforward.
A. The Genesis of Individualization and its Intersection with
Substantive Due Process
In constitutional terms, the Supreme Court’s treatment of juveniles
establishes a categorical approach that requires contextual application via
individualized assessment. In Graham v. Florida, the Court categorically
banned life without parole for non-homicide offenses with the contextual
caveat that juveniles should be given a reasonable opportunity for
parole.71 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court implored law
enforcement to consider an offender’s age when deciding whether
individuals realize that they are being held in police custody.72 In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court clarified that juveniles should be
sentenced to life without parole only on rare occasions and that an
individualized assessment must be performed before imposing such a
harsh penalty.73
Legislation affecting a juvenile’s treatment in the justice process must
consider their unique traits of youthfulness to pass constitutional muster.
The Supreme Court provides limited direction for states implementing its
declaration that “children are constitutionally different;” thus, lawmakers
traverse murky territory.74 The statutory confluence that absolutely
deprives an accused juvenile offender in criminal court of an
individualized assessment highlights structural problems that require a
unitary constitutional resolution. A moderate extension of the juvenile
sentencing cases reveals the need to develop special sentencing
guidelines for juveniles transferred to criminal courts. More ambitious
70. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (barring capital sentences for juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68
(prohibiting life without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses); Miller, 567 U.S. at 479
(holding that juvenile mandatory life sentences without parole are unconstitutional); Montgomery,
136 S. Ct. at 732 (holding Miller applies retroactively).
71. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
72. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
73. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.
74. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 542 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). In Making
the Crime Fit the Punishment, Professor Joseph Kennedy articulates a quasi-constitutional clear
statement rule for interpreting federal criminal statutes grounded in substantive due process. This
need partially arises because “it is hard to infer from the Court’s past decisions on the federal
sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, or the death penalty any desire to substitute
the Court’s own moral judgments about the proportionality of punishment for the judgment of the
relevant legislative body.” Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY
L.J. 753, 760–761 (2002).
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arguments arise, as set forth below, regarding an adolescent’s ability to
fully and effectively participate in trial proceedings. 75 What should we
consider the overarching constitutional guidance, beyond a simple
“children are different” when determining how a state should treat its
juvenile offenders?
Substantive due process accommodates the requirement that states
remain cognizant that children are different from adults when transferred
to criminal court, recognizing this as a permeating right to ensure a
juvenile’s constitutional treatment throughout the justice process. Some
constitutionally regulated areas, such as term-of-years sentences,
effective assistance of counsel, conditions of incarceration, and the
presumption of competency to stand trial have yet to be analyzed in light
of the criminal defendant’s youthfulness traits. This oversight seems
detrimental considering the well-documented disadvantages and
consequences that someone’s immaturity may play during the
adjudication phase.76 Such recognition does not require states to grant
juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, but it does
require that we identify points that are ripe for affecting fundamental
fairness based on youthfulness traits.
From the perspective of juvenile offenders, their status demands the
state to acknowledge the deficiencies associated with their youthfulness.
The liberty interest for transferred youth, protected pursuant to
substantive due process, would run more broadly than an Eighth
Amendment protection attached on the backend, at the sentencing
phase.77 These rights may be reasonably accommodated through an
individualized assessment, combined with any assistance required to
ensure fundamental fairness in adjudication proceedings, mitigated
punishments where appropriate, and rehabilitative services needed to
facilitate a meaningful opportunity for release.
Substantive due process rights stem from values deeply rooted in
American legal history and traditions but also allow for expressing
national values through constitutional law.78 A transferred juvenile’s
constitutional protections properly show our nation’s both traditional and
historical support for individualized assessment. While individualized
75. See infra notes 140–144 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L. 741 (2000).
77. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147,
171–73 (2015).
78. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972)).
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assessment for juveniles is abundant in our nation’s history and
traditions,79 the Supreme Court exercises restraint when establishing a
fundamental right under substantive due process.80 But, in using expert
research to usher in the approach of distinguishing children from adults,
individualization, and the importance of rehabilitation in criminal court
for juvenile offenders, the Court expands criminal courts’ obligations to
act in the children’s best interest when they are transferred to criminal
court.81
The pathway to no individualized assessment creates a constitutionally
untenable justice process. The obvious solutions come into play by
enacting the provisions available in other jurisdictions: reverse waiver,
expanded criminal blended sentencing, judicial approval of prosecutorial
direct file, and so on.82 At present, the Supreme Court’s juvenile
sentencing trilogy legitimizes the child development research that
supports more sweeping reforms such as increasing the jurisdictional age
limit for courts.83 A more consistent change would be to recognize
juveniles, a discrete class of individuals, as a known quantity deserving
of affirmative protections that permeate the justice process. But the state
bears additional burdens above and beyond its obligations to adult
defendants when transferring juveniles from this safe harbor to criminal
jurisdiction. Similar to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
youthfulness requires tangible procedural protections at critical stages in
the justice process.84 Moreover, comparable to special qualifications
required of death penalty counsel, attorneys for juveniles should possess

79. As compared to the historical explanation, a second explanation has been described where
substantive due process can be used by the “Supreme Court to protect new rights and to invalidate
governmental policies even if those policies have longstanding and continuing support in American
law and society . . . [and for] identification of personal liberties that it deems appropriate for our
contemporary society.” Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 63, 107, 112 (2006).
80. [B]ased on reason and therefore on reasons, albeit reasons grounded ultimately on
considerations of philosophical, moral, and political theory . . . informed by an elaborate
process of adjudication, including arguments and counterarguments from the parties and
from amici curiae, . . . in the end, the Court must defend its judgment in a written opinion.
Id. at 110.
81. When not supported by the Constitution, original intent, or “the immanent values of
American history and tradition[, i]t will instead have to defend itself by articulating with clarity and
integrity the constitutional values that inform its judgment.” Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 106 (2003).
82. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16 (explaining various transfer mechanisms).
83. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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adequate credentials when representing juveniles in criminal court.85
The right to counsel, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, attaches
throughout the justice process. In Massiah v. United States, the Supreme
Court made clear that a defendant’s right to assistance from counsel
attaches before trial.86 In reviewing an interrogation not formally
conducted in custody, the Court affirmed Powell v. Alabama’s statement
that “from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are]
vitally important, the defendants . . . [are] as much entitled to such aid [of
counsel] during that period as at the trial itself.”87 In Escobedo v. State of
Illinois, the Court clarified that pre-indictment interrogations sit
alongside preliminary hearings and arraignments, with each stage capable
of “affect[ing] the whole trial.”88 From a global perspective, the Court
reasoned that:
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth
preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult
with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with
that system.89

Similar to the right to counsel, for juveniles transferred to criminal
court, a permeating right should attach when the juvenile is initially
transferred to criminal court, persist as the case percolates through the
justice process, and continue through sentencing. This right requires the
implementation
of
procedural
measures—an
individualized
assessment—to ensure fundamental fairness despite juveniles’
youthfulness and immaturity. In addition to competency, we may even
imagine a second look at standards for requiring attorney qualification for
juveniles’ legal representation. And the list may grow as social science,

85. See Counsel for Financially Unable Defendants, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(b) (2018) (requiring
attorneys who are provided to defendants that are financially unable to obtain adequate
representation to “have been admitted to practice in the court in which the prosecution is to be tried
for not less than five years, and must have had not less than three years of experience in the actual
trial of felony prosecutions in that court.”).
86. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
87. Id. at 205 (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
60 (1932)).
88. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485–86 (1964) (quoting Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
45, 54 (1961)).
89. Id. at 490.
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developmental psychology, and neuroscience connect with the criminal
courts to identify disparities and disadvantages unique to juvenile
offenders.
The juvenile offender transferred to criminal court challenges our
constitutional and societal commitments to fundamental fairness.90
Whether prosecuting a juvenile or adult, common goals emerge to
underscore fundamental fairness: the defendant should understand the
legal proceedings, be able to assist counsel, and make decisions
independently based on sound, rational mental faculties.91 From a
constitutional perspective, juveniles’ maturity may greatly compromise
their ability to meet the competency threshold to stand trial.92 From a
societal perspective, most juvenile offenders (especially those transferred
to criminal jurisdiction) re-enter their communities with the viewpoint
that Lady Justice failed them in the fairness department. This contributes
to recidivism because it feeds hopelessness and engraves chips on
juvenile offenders’ shoulders.
Criminal laws, both in isolation and in the aggregate, would violate a
substantive due process right to individualized review when they are
enacted without deliberating the difference between children and adults
in light of research from social science, developmental psychology, and
neuroscience.93 For example, blanket prescriptions like statutory
exclusion and mandatory sentences should be considered
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, because they are not
accompanied by an individualized assessment or alternatively, evidence90. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 150–52 (noting that this challenge to fairness arises
from a lack of emphasis on competence in criminal proceedings); Introduction to Part II:
Adolescents’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 67, 68–70 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Thomas
Grisso, What we Know about Youths’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE supra, at 139, 159.
91. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 150; Introduction to Part II: Adolescents’
Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 67, 68–70; Thomas Grisso, What We Know about Youths’
Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 139, 159.
92. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (explaining that the test for
competency to stand a criminal trial is “whether [the defendant] has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him”). Currently, only three states provide competency
hearings that include developmental immaturity for juvenile offenders: South Dakota, New
Hampshire and Maine. Six states have no juvenile standard for competency evaluations: Hawaii,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Indiana and Rhode Island. Juvenile Court, Competency 2015,
JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-court#
competency-to-stand-trial?category=1 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
93. See supra notes 2, 28.
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based legitimate government justifications.94 Note that this suggestion in
no way forecloses reaching equal outcomes for an adult and juvenile
offender, but a deliberative study process must precede any such statute’s
passage. This substantive right would most often manifest through
procedural requirements.
As previously set forth, substantive due process rights are deeply
rooted in American legal history and tradition, but they also allow for the
expression of national values through constitutional law.95 History and
tradition confirm that children require special attention when accused of
criminal activity, and both the process of adjudication and punishment
should vary from adult criminal trials due to sweeping considerations that
are unique to the offender’s age.96 Considering the historical separation
between juvenile and adult offenders, which has been illustrated in legal
precedent combined with empirical research on adolescents, provides a
necessary check on judicial overreach.97 Regarding history and tradition,
Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, infamously wrote that:
through the course of this Court’s decisions [due process] has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organized society . . . . The balance of which I speak
is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.98

The terms and conditions applied to juvenile delinquents build on ageold principles. The socio-political history, dating back to Progressive era
reforms and legal precedent, shows the deep roots individualized review
for juveniles has in American history; however, this issue as a procedural
94. Post, supra note 81, at 97–98 (arguing that whereas substantive due process finds support
in tradition, the Lawrence v. Texas opinion demonstrates that “the Court is concerned with
constitutional values that have not heretofore found their natural home in the Due Process Clause”).
95. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
96. In describing the historical tradition approach based on Glucksberg, Conkle explains “it is
our national history that delimits and circumscribes the rights that qualify for special protection.
And this national history is itself revealed by ‘deeply rooted’ societal patterns and legal policies.”
Conkle, supra note 79, at 91.
97. “[T]he approach of historical tradition provides an objective standard of decisionmaking,
and it is a standard that judges are competent to employ on a consistent and principled basis.” Id.
at 92. Judicial overreach has been a traditional argument against enumerating new fundamental
rights, stemming from the failures of the Lochner v. New York era, when a right to free contracting
was deemed fundamental as a substantive due process right. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This view of
freedom to contract as a fundamental right resulted in lack of governmental regulation regarding
labor conditions and pay.
98. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961).
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problem suffers from such an analytical approach.99 The common law
drew age distinctions in an attempt to assign culpability for criminal
behavior.100 Juvenile courts were established pursuant to the common
law doctrine of parens patriae.101 The foundational goal of rehabilitating
delinquents remains a founding pillar of juvenile jurisdiction.102
The Supreme Court accommodated youthfulness traits in sentencing
juveniles by accepting advancements in social science, developmental
psychology, and neuroscience.103 On its face, this breaks the historical,
traditional mold. It moves the Court further from majoritarian support to
upholding a counter-majoritarian narrative deemed constitutional by an
independent, yet unelected federal branch of government.104
Substantive due process as a doctrinal justification draws skepticism
from some legal observers and provides legal cover for the Court’s
intervention into truly controversial national conversations.105 Skeptics
of enumerating new substantive due process rights might argue that, if
the Supreme Court enumerated a fundamental right to individualized
review, it would at minimum substitute its judgment for that of elected
state legislators in shaping criminal law, as it applies to juvenile
offenders; on the other hand, the proposal herein may be viewed as a
nudge for state legislators to rethink their policymaking process when
criminalizing juvenile behavior.106 Substantive due process rights are
99. Glucksberg requires a narrowly defined issue supported through history and tradition.
Conkle argues that, in determining whether a substantive due process right exists, the Court “is
discerning the precise nature of the political-moral issue at hand so that it can determine whether
an asserted claim of liberty has the affirmative support of a historical tradition, thereby providing
the claim with a majoritarian sanction.” Conkle, supra note 79, at 93.
100. See Tiffani Darden, Exploring the Spectrum: How the Law May Advance a Social
Movement, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 261, 273–74 (2016) (explaining how Graham, Roper, and Miller
considered juveniles’ lack of culpability due to immaturity to require individualized review in
certain circumstances).
101. Tanenhaus, supra note 4, at 17–18 (illustrating that the recognition of the childhood and
social conceptions of law informed the juvenile courts’ basis in the medieval English doctrine of
parens patriae).
102. See Darden, supra note 100, at 273 (explaining the holdings in Graham, Roper, and Miller
“that juveniles carry less culpability” and therefore “deserve lesser punishment and more
rehabilitation”).
103. See supra notes 2, 3, 28; Conkle, supra note 79, at 94, 139–40 (illustrating the ingredients
of a forward looking rationale, as compared to a backward looking rationale).
104. Conkle, supra note 79, at 107, 112 (explaining that an unelected Court using the “theory
of reasoned judgment permits substantive due process to perform a nationalizing function through
the recognition and protection of fundamental rights as a matter of constitutional law”).
105. Id. at 64.
106. Conkle opined that “it is hardly surprising that some have condemned the entire enterprise
of substantive due process, calling it an unjustified judicial usurpation of political power and a
flagrant violation of the basic principle of majoritarian self-government.” Id. at 78–79.
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based on the Court’s reasoned judgment, which entails balancing
personal liberty interests against countervailing government interests.107
The state’s interests in supporting jurisdictional waiver to criminal court
for juvenile offenders can be gleaned from adoption of the Kent factors
by most state courts. Noticeably, the proffered reasons for supporting
jurisdictional waiver omit any attempt to reconcile these interests,
centered around public safety, with the state’s “best interest” commitment
to minor children.
The Supreme Court rarely grants affirmative rights through its
constitutional interpretations, and the Court’s constitutional explications
rarely arrive as a package deal adhering throughout an entire process;
instead, substantive due process holdings lean toward prohibiting
government interventions associated with a well-defined interest.108
Here, the liberty interest revolves around recognizing that juvenile
offenders lack the capacity to endure an adult criminal justice system, and
the resulting need to construct evidence-based policies identifying where
their youthful traits make juveniles acutely vulnerable to suffering
disadvantages based on their age. To fully appreciate this constitutional
protection, we must not isolate any particular stage in the justice process
from transfer to adjudication to sentencing. Instead, the notion that
“children are different” requires states to view a process that at any
juncture may disadvantage juvenile offenders in different ways based on
individualized traits, culminating in the aggregate at the Eighth
Amendment sentencing stage.109
The constitutional acceptance that children are different from adults
seems to have penetrated only so far through our treatment of juvenile
offenders. Whereas the juvenile court stridently implements philosophies
and practices that stand in stark contrast to criminal jurisdiction, not much
promise for an overhaul appears on the horizon for children who find
themselves dropped into an adult’s world. Juvenile and criminal courts
have shared a nebulous partition for over one hundred years. Since the
inception of juvenile courts, state legislatures have debated upper age
limits and the transfer option.110 Judicial waiver stood as the predominant
107. Id. at 66–67 (explaining this approach and noting that the Court used it in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
108. See Yoshino, supra note 77, at 167–68 (illustrating the Court’s shift from the use of
negative/positive rights to a concept of equality).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
110. Tanenhaus, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that age limits “kept older children out of the
juvenile justice system” and the transfer option allowed judges to remove those accused of heinous
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transfer mechanism for several decades, during which time judges
undertook individualized assessments of youth offenders to determine
their amenability to treatment or their need for more severe punishment
in criminal court.111 Individualized assessment should not end once the
decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court has been made. A
substantive due process right to individualized review throughout the
entire process in criminal court will ensure juveniles are afforded the
same opportunity to withstand the criminal justice process as adults.
B. Fictitious Status Equivalence
The legal fiction of children being equal to their adult counterparts may
be written in statutes, but it does not convert the state’s substantive
commitments to juveniles.112 The Supreme Court has made clear that
even though criminal courts may handle cases involving juvenile
offenders, states must accommodate youthful attributes when
appropriate.113 The choice to transfer children from juvenile jurisdiction
should not exonerate states from their parens patriae duties for minors in
government custody. Lessened culpability requires more than merely a
reduced sentence to fulfill a state’s obligations to its youthful individuals.
The Supreme Court chipped away at the worst-case scenarios using broad
language, but its opinions leave little guidance for decisions regarding
transfer and sentencing of children in criminal court.114
crimes from the juvenile system); Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 4, at 207, 207 (characterizing the transfer option as a “universal exception to a
universal rule”).
111. Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 45,
45 (illustrating that judicial waiver weighed the juvenile’s capability of rehabilitation against
“whether the interest of the community would be served by the prosecution of that offense in
criminal court rather than juvenile court”).
112. For example, Louisiana state actors may transfer juvenile offenders to adult criminal court
using various procedures: discretionary waiver, mandatory waiver, prosecutorial discretion and
statutory exclusion. Once in criminal jurisdiction, the justice system provides no pathway back to
juvenile jurisdiction via reverse waiver or juvenile or criminal blended sentencing provisions.
Juvenile Court, Transfer Provisions, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT.,
http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries/louisiana#transfer-provisions?age=-1&offense=-1
&policy=3&year=2016 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
113. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); Miller v. Alabama 567 U.S.
460, 479 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
576–77 (2005).
114. Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the
Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 147 (2013) (“The Court has reached the outer limits of what it
can accomplish through interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. . . . The specific amount by which
sentences imposed on youths should be substantially discounted is a political and legislative value
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Together, Roper, Graham, and Miller shined a light on juvenile
sentencing practices.115 But the constitutional difference between
juvenile and adult offenders implicates fundamental fairness rights long
before reaching the sentencing phase. In Miller, the Supreme Court began
drawing distinctions between the purpose of individualized assessments
at varying phases in the adjudication process.116 The Miller majority
distinguished between an individualized assessment for a juvenile
offender at a discretionary judicial waiver determination and at the
sentencing stage.117 The Court gave two reasons for making this
distinction: first, “the decisionmaker typically will have only partial
information at this early, pretrial stage about either the child or the
circumstances of his offense;” and second, “the question at transfer
hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a post-trial
sentencing. . . . It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor
deserves a (much) harsher sentence . . . while still not thinking lifewithout-parole appropriate.”118 For those reasons, a judge’s available
discretion at the transfer stage cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial
sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy the Eighth Amendment.
Miller dismissed the argument that a jurisdictional waiver evaluation
equates to the individualized assessment required to ensure the
constitutional protections attached with imposing a sentence of life
without parole.119 Therefore, the imagination need not travel far to argue
in good faith that discretionary transfer statutes also may not stand in lieu
of pinpointing the critical stages where one’s youthful individual traits
must be acknowledged to guarantee fundamental fairness in the justice
process.
With this in mind, the same social science, developmental psychology,
and neuroscience research supports the need for individualized
assessments in other specific parts of the criminal justice process where
constitutional rights are potentially infringed due to a juvenile’s
immaturity.120 Trial rights for youth offenders as trial defendants provide
choice.”); Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 110 (2013) (questioning the
diminished capacity rationale’s application to juvenile reform beyond death penalty and mandatory
life without parole).
115. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 556; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Montgomery,
136 S. Ct. at 734.
116. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480–89.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 488.
119. Id. at 482–83.
120. See supra notes 2, 28.
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the most urgent example where policy recommendations based on
developmental research would have a constitutional foothold under
current substantive due process arguments as an area in which “juveniles
are constitutionally different from adults.”121 Adjusting competency
standards for transferred juveniles marks a solid next target in both
expanding a juvenile’s distinct constitutional rights as compared to their
adult counterparts and defining a permeating right, under substantive due
process, for youth offenders in criminal courts.122
Few jurisdictions weigh a juvenile’s diminished capacity, as compared
to adult offenders, when considering their ability to meet constitutional
competency standards.123 In juvenile court, competency holds less
significance because, at least in theory, the civil proceedings of that court
seek to rehabilitate rather than punish the accused.124 But juvenile
developmental characteristics should affect the competency evaluation,
and this evaluation then necessarily demands a resolution that is different
from that of an adult deemed incompetent to stand trial.
This opinion enjoys credibility among scholars. In Youth on Trial and
Rethinking Juvenile Justice, scholars asserted that ensuring a defendant’s
competence serves more than an individualistic interest. It also secures
societal interests in three ways: “preserving the dignity of the criminal
process, reducing the risk of erroneous convictions, and protecting the
defendant’s decision-making autonomy.”125 The denoted baseline,
wrapped into the term “competency,” must be present throughout the
121. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005)); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 150 (explaining that using these
differences when implementing the principles of proportionality and due process is a way to further
ensure fundamental fairness). Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and
Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 73, 85–86, 90 (“In our view, considerations of both fairness and judicial
economy suggest that the juvenile’s competence to proceed in the criminal court should be a
prerequisite for waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.”).
122. “In short, the same concerns that support the prohibition against trying criminal defendants
who are incompetent due to mental impairment apply with equal force when immature youths are
subject to criminal proceedings.” SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 157.
123. Three states provide competency hearings that include developmental immaturity for
juvenile offenders: South Dakota, New Hampshire and Maine. Six states have no juvenile standard
for competency evaluations: Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Indiana and Rhode
Island. Juvenile Court, Competency 2015, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT.,
http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-court#sex-offense-registry?year=2015 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
124. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 82–83 (noting that because juvenile proceedings do
not have the punitive purposes of criminal proceedings, the importance of competency is
diminished based on juvenile proceedings’ “rehabilitative objectives”).
125. Id. at 76; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 153 (noting that these three basic
functions serve as basic rationales for the competence requirement).
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justice process—from pretrial hearings, to plea offerings, to trial and
sentencing. Reviewing the subject from an adult defendant’s viewpoint
and layering in the complications for juvenile defendants based on social
science research clearly exposes how policy suggestions from the past
two decades should now gain greater fortitude as constitutional
obligations under the juvenile sentencing holdings.126
Dusky v. United States set forth the path for measuring a criminal
defendant’s competency to stand trial.127 A criminal defendant must have
both a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and a “rational as well as
factual understanding of proceedings against him.”128 Shortly thereafter,
Drope v. Missouri solidified competency as a fundamental fairness
right.129 Based on Supreme Court precedent, an adult defendant, when
deemed incompetent to stand trial, will spend up to six months receiving
rehabilitative psychiatric care.130
Youth competency requires a different approach. An individualized
assessment provides valuable insight because maturity varies greatly
from one juvenile offender to another.131 The sophisticated offender with
superior knowledge based on repeat contact with the system has proven
to be a myth; instead, intelligence, race, socioeconomic status, and mental
health, rather than experience, influence children’s understanding of the
legal process.132 For some youth, their attorney may be able to informally
fill in the gaps of their knowledge. But an immature youth, or one
suffering from emotional disturbances or learning disabilities, will not be
cured in six months with a pill or institutionalization.133 Unfortunately,
social scientists and juvenile advocates have concluded that merely
requesting an evaluation provides a constitutional salve with little

126. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–77; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
127. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
128. Id. at 402.
129. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
130. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 78–79.
131. “There is a great deal of individual variation in maturation rates; . . . [A]dolescence and
adulthood are not tidy developmental categories; the transition to adulthood is a gradual process.”
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 237. See Grisso, supra note 90, at 163 (showing that youths
under fourteen years old are less likely to be competent, but age tends to be a bad indicator of
competence for youths ages fourteen to sixteen).
132. Grisso, supra note 90, at 151–52, 163 (pointing to studies that show intellectual
functioning, ethnicity and socioeconomic status, mental disorder are correlative to understanding
of legal information rather than age and experience).
133. Id. at 164.
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attention given to “getting it right” on mental competency. 134 At this
time, some states address competency to stand trial at the waiver stage,
either via statute or pursuant to judicial mandate.135
Upon counsel’s advice, defendants must individually decide whether
to plead guilty, whether to seek a jury or bench trial, whether to testify or
exercise the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, whether a particular
defense seems advantageous, and whether the overall strategy feels
palpable. A lack of competency to stand trial in adult criminal court poses
the greatest threat to adolescents fifteen years old and younger. 136 First,
the standard criteria of mental illness presents differently in youth than
they do in adults.137 Second, a youth offender may be at a disadvantage
due to developmental immaturity, a trait not contemplated when
evaluating adults for competency. 138 Younger defendants may
understand the proceedings to a satisfactory degree on the surface, but
their decision-making acumen could be impaired based on developmental
immaturity.139
In Youth on Trial, Professor Thomas Grisso separates minors’ abilities
into two concepts: (1) adolescents’ competence to stand trial and (2) their
effectiveness of participation.140 An example showing an adolescent’s
lack of competence to stand trial manifests in juveniles’ incomplete
understanding of rights.141 Also, youth offenders do not fully appreciate
134. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 151 (illustrating that competency requirements
were a response to judicial decisions requiring it for due process and not for the purpose of ensuring
juveniles were actually competent to stand trial); Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 78 (noting
that, in practice, “adjudicative competence is that asking the question is more important than getting
the ‘right’ answer” because “the criminal justice system [has] a variety of motivations for raising”
the competence issue other than the basic rationales underlying the doctrine itself); see VA. CODE
§ 16.1-269.1(A)(3) (2018) (requiring a juvenile to be considered “competent to stand trial” as a
condition to discretionary judicial transfer. In Virginia, juveniles are “presumed to be competent
and the burden is on the party alleging the juvenile is not competent to rebut the presumption by a
preponderance of the evidence . . .”).
135. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 151.
136. “Judicial review of the defendant’s competence for criminal adjudication should be
mandatory in cases involving fourteen- to fifteen-year-old defendants.” Bonnie & Grisso, supra
note 121, at 90.
137. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 159–60; Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 87–
88; Grisso, supra note 90, at 160 (noting that youths have certain psychosocial characteristics that
are “in transition,” including responsibility, temperance, and perspective).
138. Note 137, supra.
139. Note 137, supra.
140. “[E]ffectiveness of participation focuses us on a continuum of lesser to greater capacities
for contributing to one’s defense, and it provides a foundation for seeking ways to maximize
defendants’ effectiveness.” Grisso, supra note 90, at 141.
141. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 159 (illustrated through a conversation with one
of the author’s twelve-year-old son, who when asked what the right to remain silent meant,
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long-term consequences.142 Moreover, their status as adolescents in a
process inundated with adults could inhibit effective participation.143
I propose that effective assistance of counsel should also be enveloped
into the substantive due process rights that deserve protection based on a
juvenile’s constitutional differences from their adult counterparts. Even
before transfer, based possibly on prosecutorial discretion, juveniles may
have shucked the right to remain silent and attain counsel, thus providing
information that the prosecutor can use to make a decision on waiver.144
However, many youths do not fully appreciate their rights and the role
that counsel can play in protecting those rights.145 This deficit based on
maturity associated with age cannot go ignored by state courts.
The juvenile sentencing cases formulate a constitutional class, but the
procedural cases predating this era too often simply conscript adult rights
to be applied in the juvenile context. In re Gault recognized concerns
affiliated with young defendants, which heightened the attorney’s role:
The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile
Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege [against
self-incrimination]. If counsel was not present for some permissible
reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken
to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it
was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.146

The Court often speaks in cautionary terms, but the Court has never
installed state obligations unique to a juvenile offender in criminal courts
before the sentencing stage.
As the Court’s doctrine creates a paint-by-numbers portrait of juvenile
justice, legal commentators and advocates continue to understand the full
heft to be gained from the Court’s supplementation of common sense by
considering science and social science to attain some significance in
shaping constitutional law. The Graham and Miller Courts hypothesized
responded “It means you don’t have to say anything until the police ask you a question.”); Grisso,
supra note 90, at 149 (stating that one-half to two thirds of adolescents did not understand that a
court could not penalize them for avoiding self-incrimination, compared to thirty percent of adults).
142. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 121, at 91.
143. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 160 (arguing that an adolescent may not understand
the role of an attorney and may feel as though all of the adults are allied against them, particularly
if they see their attorney speaking with the prosecutor outside of the courtroom); Bonnie & Grisso,
supra note 121, at 89.
144. THOMAS J. BERNARD & MEGAN C. KURLYCHEK, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 167
(2d ed. 2010).
145. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
146. Id. at 55.
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that harsh sentences may share a connection to an adolescent’s inability
to effectively communicate with law enforcement and meaningfully
engage in criminal court proceedings.147 Scholarship fully diagnoses the
import of lessened culpability both before and after the Court’s reliance
on social science, developmental psychology and neuroscience research;
the rehabilitation ideal also receives much attention, but the role of trial
competence deserves analysis in this context.148
The fundamental fairness rights historically granted to children in
juvenile court protected their individual procedural rights.149 The
Supreme Court’s sentencing cases bring individualization to this same
group even when they have been deemed adults under criminal law.150
Youthfulness traits transcend the jurisdictional distinction established in
state houses. The sentencing trilogy resurrected and formalized what was
already known from Kent v. United States and the cases injecting
fundamental fairness into the juvenile court.151 The reach to realizing that
children are constitutionally different seems able to grow with our
knowledge about adolescent development if challenges are properly
scrutinized under substantive due process in a manner established by the
Court’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment precedents.152
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCE TRANSCENDS JURISDICTION
In nearly a dozen states, transfer and sentencing procedures suppress
any formal weight that may be given to youthful characteristics.153 There
exists a too-often-traveled but rarely exposed unconstitutional road to
147. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78
(2012). See ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., MODELS FOR CHANGE: SYS. REFORM IN JUVENILE JUSTICE,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING 4 (2015),
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/778 (noting that “‘developmental’ incompetence
has become very salient in the past generation”).
148. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 147, at 4.
149. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
150. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735–36 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 480;
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
151. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553–54 (1966).
152. Pointing to Lawrence v. Texas and Grutter v. Bollinger as illustrations, Professor Robert
Post observes that the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional law at times permits space for
adjustment when constitutional culture and values are not settled on a contentious social debate.
Post, supra note 81, at 104–05. Conkle, supra note 79, at 67–68 (“[S]ubstantive due process
protects a set of evolving national values, values that command widespread contemporary support,
as evidenced by legal developments and societal understandings that may change over time.”).
153. These include Alabama, DC, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Utah, and Washington. See generally Juvenile Court, Intake and Diversion 2016,
JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-court#sex-offenseregistry?year=2015.
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treatment as an adult in the justice process. The only detour that may
occur arises for those being threatened with life-without-parole sentences
upon conviction.154 Some states convict more juveniles than others under
life-without-parole statutes: Michigan convicted disproportionately large
numbers of juvenile offenders pursuant to those statutes, along with
California, Florida, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania.155 Beginning in Roper
v. Simmons and culminating with Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court depended on generalized youthful traits to mitigate the most severe
of those sentences.156 These characteristics include immaturity,
susceptibility to environmental pressures, and malleable personalities.157
The Court’s acceptance of this developmental psychology supported a
conclusion that an adolescent’s amorphous self-determination
undermines the notion that “even a heinous crime committed by a
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”158
A. Beyond Juvenile Jurisdiction for Severe Misdeeds
In Vienna Township, Michigan, in October 2017, five teens were held
without bond on second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
second-degree murder charges.159 The teens, ranging from age fifteen to
seventeen, had thrown numerous rocks off a bridge onto the expressway
below.160 One of those rocks struck and damaged a van, which swerved
off the road.161 The front-seat passenger in that van, a young father
returning home from a blue-collar hard day’s work, died from their illfated actions.162 The Genesee County prosecutor swiftly decided to try
all five defendants in adult criminal court.163 This case raises policy
154. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
155. AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE U.S., 35 tbl.5 (2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2005/10/11/rest-their-lives/life-without-parole-child-offenders-united-states.
156. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
553 (2005).
157. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
158. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553.
159. Karma Allen, 4 of 5 Teens in Deadly Michigan Rock-Throwing Case Attempt Plea Deals,
ABC NEWS (July 17, 2018, 4:35 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/teens-deadly-michigan-rockthrowing-case-accept-plea/story?id=56634773.
160. Id.
161. Mike Martindale, 4 of 5 Teens Accept Plea Deals in I-75 Rock-Throwing Death, DETROIT
NEWS (July 16, 2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/2018/07/16/4-teensaccept-plea-deal-75-rock-throwing-death/789011002/.
162. Id.
163. 5 Teens Charged as Adults in Rock-Throwing Death on I-75 in Vienna Township,
WWMT.COM (Oct. 23, 2017), https://wwmt.com/news/state/5-teens-charged-as-adults-in-rockthrowing-incident-on-i-75-in-vienna-township.
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questions stemming from traditional legal practices, developmental
psychology, constitutional shifts in favor of children’s rights in the
criminal system, and social attitudes. Public comments demanding
retribution and shunning contrary perspectives spewed forth in response
to this tragedy.164 Many expressed sentiments similar to the following:
“What thoughtless idiots! They deserve long prison sentences. So
unbelievably senseless.” Yes, bad acts warrant due consequences; these
teens should, if found guilty under the law, be held accountable for their
misdeeds. But the law no longer tolerates an unmoored mob mentality or
turning a blind eye on the perpetrators’ age-related developmental
shortcomings. The justice process cannot overlook the constitutionally
recognized differences between children and adults when prosecuting or
punishing criminality.165
Raising the jurisdictional limit in Michigan would have affected the
fate of those teens from Vienna, but a singular focus on jurisdictional age
limits leaves intact transfer procedures. The national “raise-the-age”
campaign has proven successful just this year in nudging New York and
North Carolina to raise the age at which offenders are automatically sent
to criminal court, a legislative change to be gradually phased in over two
to three-year periods.166 Michigan sits alongside a handful of states
reticent about increasing the maximum jurisdictional age for juvenile
courts above sixteen years old.167 But not even successful raise-the-age
advocacy could save the five youths charged in Genesee County,
Michigan from a justice process that appears unwilling to consider their
164. Associated Press, 5 Michigan Teens Charged with Murder After Rock Thrown from
Highway Overpass Kills Man, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:56 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-michigan-teens-rock-incident20171023-story.html.
165. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016); (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005)).
166. See generally RAISE THE AGE NY, http://raisetheageny.com/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
167. States that limit juvenile jurisdiction to age sixteen or below are Wisconsin, Michigan,
Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Missouri. See WIS. STAT. § 938.02(10m) (2018) (defining
“juvenile” when “investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated any state or
federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance,” as not including “a person who has
attained 17 years of age”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(a) (2018) (granting exclusive original
jurisdiction to the family division of circuit court for those under 17 years old if they are charged
with certain offenses); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)(A) (West 2015) (defining “[c]hild” as
someone “ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(10)(B)
(2018) (defining “[c]hild” as someone “[u]nder the age of 17 years when alleged to have committed
a delinquent act”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(1) (2008) (defining “[c]hild” as “a person less than
seventeen years of age”); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031(1)(3) (2018) (“[T]he juvenile court . . . shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings . . . [i]nvolving . . . any person who is alleged to
have violated a state law . . . prior to attaining the age of seventeen years.”).
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age as a mitigating factor.
The Genesee County prosecutor’s press conference addressed the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s death, the charges, and potential
punishments while ignoring the age of those accused.168 And in
Michigan, their age will not be considered to mitigate their
blameworthiness for these actions or the sentence if convicted on these
charges. In the worst-case scenario, they are convicted of second-degree
murder and the judge entertains a sentence of life without parole.169
Remember, of course, that this is an outcome that the Supreme Court
thinks should be imposed rarely.170 In fact, the Supreme Court purchased
Lady Justice discerning spectacles to use whenever minors enter any
jurisdiction threatening the loss of their liberty, be it juvenile or criminal.
There was one moment in which the Genesee Sheriff spoke
incontrovertible truth: “At the end of the day nobody wins. The young
people are charged criminally, a young boy lost his father and all of the
families are left grieving.”171 From there, these state-elected law
enforcement officials digressed into statements wholly detached from
constitutional norms.172 The prosecutor and sheriff boasted about their
dereliction of the indisputable constitutional norm that children are
different from adults.173 Sheriff Pickell approached the podium by stating
“I want to commend Prosecutor Leyton for the strong stand that he has
taken today in charging second-degree murder along with conspiracy and
other charges.”174 The joint press conference continued along with one
revelatory statement after another showing both men’s obliviousness
about what most know to be adolescent behavior.
The sheriff justified the charges in terms of general deterrence: “I think
if there’s any admonition, any warning that both David and I can give—
168. Brian Thompson, Five Teens Charged with Murder in Rock Throwing Incident Near Flint,
MI HEADLINES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.miheadlines.com/2017/10/23/five-teens-chargedwith-murder-in-rock-throwing-incident-near-flint/ [hereinafter Genesee County Press Conference]
(providing a video of the press conference).
169. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (describing that in some states, judges
do have the discretion to apply life-without-parole to juveniles).
170. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
171. Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168; Amanda Jackson, Rock Dropped from
Overpass Kills Passenger in Car; Teens Charged, CNN (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:27 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/23/us/flint-teens-rock-throwing-murder-trnd/index.html (reporting
incident and including video coverage).
172. See generally Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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it’s telling young people: you make a bad decision, you could be spending
the rest of your life in prison. This is not a prank.”175 The psychological
evidence, of course, does not support general deterrence as an effective
punishment goal for juveniles.176 Yet both men impressed upon their
audience that the prosecutor “threw the book” at these teens and he could
not could not “charge anything more.”177 And “second-degree murder is
punishable by up to life in prison.”178 Meanwhile, Graham and Miller
dedicated their prose to undercutting the legitimacy of life without parole
for juveniles.179
The prosecutor referenced these teenagers using adult standards of
behavior, stating what “a reasonable person would know,” and claiming
that “these people should have known better. These people should have
realized that their actions would cause great bodily harm or death and
under Michigan law that’s second-degree murder.”180 The act, in and of
itself, is a childish activity. And the conspiracy attaches because law
enforcement believed that “prior to the actual events they discussed
getting rocks and going out there and hurling them.”181 The irony reveals
itself when noting that these actions are exactly those that juveniles
commonly exhibit. Juveniles more often act in groups and exhibit an
increased susceptibility to peer pressure.182
The prosecutor and sheriff sought to allay the public’s fears that
anyone may be “soft on crime” by reminding the community that law
enforcement threw the book at these young defendants, that a more
serious charge could not be brought under state law, and that seconddegree murder is eligible for a sentence of life in prison. Yet children are
not miniature adults.183 This realization guides the hallmarks of our
juvenile justice system and the impetus for our Supreme Court’s mandate
175. Id.
176. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“[T]he absence of evidence of deterrent
effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than
adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”).
177. Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168.
178. Id.
179. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317 (2018) (“[M]urder of the second degree . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years, in the discretion of the
court trying the same.”). See generally Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168.
180. See generally Genesee County Press Conference, supra note 168.
181. Id.
182. Dustin Albert et al., Peer Influences on Adolescent Decision Making, 22 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 114, 115 (2013), available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/0963721412471347 (“[P]eer influences [are] a primary contextual factor contributing to
adolescents’ heightened tendency to make risky decisions.”).
183. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011).
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that these youthful characteristics should be considered before imposing
a punishment of life without parole on young offenders.184 Raise-the-age
efforts address the most significant contributor to children being retained
in juvenile courts: the upper and lower age limits established by state
jurisdiction.185 Yet transfer laws lay bare deficiencies in the justice
process, which, with no pause, neglect to make an individualized
assessment of youthful traits indispensable when considering culpability
and punishment.186
Youthful characteristics lessen one’s culpability for criminal
behavior—meaning age transcends both crime and jurisdictional
boundaries.187 Michigan’s justice process ignores this constitutional
mandate. Michigan keeps company with approximately a dozen states
that forge a pathway lacking any accommodation for youthfulness once
a minor is transferred to criminal court.188 And this road sits obscured
from the public’s eye. How does this happen?
In these states, a youth offender is transferred to criminal court through
prosecutorial direct file or statutory exclusion, neither of which requires
an individualized assessment.189 Then, Michigan state law does not
afford this jurisdictional assignment any right to reconsideration through
a reverse waiver hearing which would usually entail an individualized
assessment by the criminal judge.190 If convicted, state law may require

184. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
185. See, e.g., id. at 466, 468 (referencing Arkansas and Alabama age limits); RAISE THE AGE
NY, supra note 166.
186. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16 (analyzing state transfer laws).
187. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833–35 (1988) (“[T]he Court has already endorsed
the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require
extended explanation.”).
188. See Juvenile Court, Intake and Diversion 2016, supra note 153.
189. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (“Statutory exclusion laws grant criminal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over certain classes of cases involving juvenile-age offenders. If a case falls
within a statutory exclusion category, it must be filed originally in criminal court.”); Benjamin
Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative Effects of State Direct File Waiver Laws on Violent
Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1451, 1451 (2006)
(“Concurrent jurisdiction, or direct file, statutes afford prosecutors the unreviewable discretion to
charge certain juveniles in either juvenile or criminal court.”).
190. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (“Reverse waiver laws allow juveniles whose
cases are in criminal court to petition to have them transferred to juvenile court.”); see also Written
Comments of Amicus Curiae Human Rights Watch, Henry Hill v. United States, Case No. 12.866,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. app. (2014), available at https://www.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/2014_03_19_hrw_amicus_appendix_
state_transfer_laws.pdf [hereinafter State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws] (noting that
Michigan does not provide a reverse waiver mechanism).
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a minimum or mandatory punishment with no option for a blended
sentence which would permit an individualized assessment.191 Instead,
with no reverse waiver or blended sentencing statute in Michigan, the
final opportunity for an individualized assessment would be a petition to
consider life without parole.192 Most serious charges that fall within this
window are not eligible for the harshest penalty available to juvenile
offenders and thus miss this opportunity as well. Because this system
does not take youthfulness into account, it does not comport with
constitutional standards.
Moreover, this case study shows how the justice process grants little
attention to a teen’s competency to stand trial. Three of the five teens
accused in Michigan sought competency hearings.193 The state examiners
deemed all three mentally competent to stand trial in criminal court.194 In
response, their defense attorneys requested independent evaluations; the
trial judge granted these defense motions.195 One lawyer stated,
While my client may be considered competent to aid in his defense in
the cozy confines of a doctor’s office, under the bright lights of the
courtroom, juveniles tend to have a different mindset. . . . In these
circumstances where we have a child facing his loss of liberty, it’s
extremely prudent to leave no stone unturned and get this independent
examination.196

Every state grants judges the discretion to transfer cases from juvenile
to criminal court.197 Discretionary judicial waiver takes place under
transparent due process standards.198 In conjunction with employing
juvenile psychology experts who are knowledgeable of the offender’s
circumstances, the juvenile judge makes an individual assessment based
on several factors that evaluate the alleged offense, the defendant’s
191. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 3 (showing which states employed certain waiver
and sentencing schemes as of 2011).
192. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized
sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
193. See Martindale, supra note 161.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Oona Goodin-Smith, Teens Charged in Deadly I-75 Rock Throwing to Get Second Mental
Health Exam, MLIVE (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2018/01/
second_opinion_needed_before_t.html (quoting Frank J. Manley).
197. See State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190.
198. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555–57 (1966) (explaining that “the critically
important” judicial waiver decision entitles a juvenile “to a hearing, including access by his counsel
to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court,
and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.”).
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background and profile, and institutional concerns.199 Only fifteen states
grant prosecutors discretion to choose to bring charges against a youth
defendant in either juvenile or criminal court.200 Of these prosecutorial
direct file states, only Michigan and Florida do not provide a check on
these decisions by a criminal judge via reverse waiver procedures. 201 In
Michigan, the minimum age for prosecutorial discretion is set at fourteen
years old for enumerated offenses; thereafter, these juveniles must be
sentenced “in the same manner as an adult.”202 And although many states
have enacted blended sentencing statutes that consider a defendant’s age
after conviction in criminal court, the Michigan blended sentencing
statute only provides for individualized assessment under limited
circumstances involving drug charges.203
Some states responded to Miller v. Alabama with sweeping reforms
targeted at the juvenile system.204 Texas overhauled its system to
abandon life without parole as a sentencing option for convicted
juveniles, permit transfer only through discretionary waiver provisions,
and permit juveniles to challenge transfer decisions through an expedited
appeals process.205 California dispensed with prosecutorial direct file by
passing Proposition 57, which requires a juvenile court to review transfer
petitions seeking to prosecute youth offenders in criminal court.206 On
the other end of the spectrum, Michigan state actors continue to
demonstrate a persistent reticence against moderating their treatment of
juvenile offenders to reflect the essence of recent constitutional
rulings.207

199. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(4)(a)–(f) (2018) (explaining that a judge must
consider the “seriousness of the alleged offense . . . [t]he culpability of the juvenile [and] . . . [t]he
adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system,” among other
factors when determining whether to waive jurisdiction).
200. See State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190.
201. See id. at 10, 23 (providing data for Florida and Michigan).
202. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2d (2018).
203. Id. § 712A.2d (1)–(9) (explaining that a court must consider specified individual factors
when determining whether to grant prosecutorial waiver, but this only applies in regard to
“specified juvenile violation[s],” which include assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, escape
from a juvenile facility, and drug offenses, none of which would have applied to the Vienna
defendants).
204. See 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
205. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 2017).
206. Proposition 57: The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 Frequently Asked
Questions, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB., (updated May 2018), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
proposition57/docs/FAQ-General-Pro-57-Final-Regs-May-2018.pdf.
207. See Jessica Pishko, The Troubled Resentencing of America’s Juvenile Lifers, THE NATION
(Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/juvenile-lifers-last-chance/.
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In fact, the Michigan Supreme Court initially declined to retroactively
resentence juveniles previously sentenced to life.208 Eventually, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana initiated a
resentencing process that has produced mixed outcomes across the
country.209 In the same year, many states—California, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio, and Wyoming—ruled that
resentencing should contemplate a meaningful opportunity for release
and not result in a de facto life sentence exceeding natural life
expectancy.210 On the other hand, Michigan prosecutors initially sought
to reinstate the life-without-parole sentences for a significant portion of
the state’s petitioners in contradiction of progressive interpretations.211
But, the state’s legislature eventually enacted law requiring the courts to
impose “a term of imprisonment for which the maximum term shall be
60 years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more
than 40 years.”212 As interpreted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the

208. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 849 (Mich. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub
nom. Carp v. Michigan, 136 S. Ct. 1355 (Mem) (2016), and cert. granted, judgment vacated sub
nom. Davis v. Michigan, 136 S. Ct. 1356 (Mem) (2016).
209. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
210. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1060, 1064 (Cal. 2016) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §
3051(e) (2018)) (stating “[i]n short, a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP for a homicide offense without the protections outlined in Miller” and explaining that “[t]he
Legislature has declared that ‘[t]he youth offender parole hearing to consider release shall provide
for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release’”); Connecticut v. Delgado, 151 A.3d 345, 355
(Conn. 2016) (applying Montgomery in a resentencing case but ultimately finding the particular
case did not need resentencing); Atwell v. Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 2016) (“A
presumptive parole release date set decades beyond a natural lifespan is at odds with the Supreme
Court’s recent pronouncement in Montgomery.”); People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 888 (Ill. 2016)
(“A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical
effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—
in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison . . . . [A] juvenile may not be sentenced to a
mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity,
and potential for rehabilitation.”); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016) (“[W]e adopt
a categorical rule that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to life without the possibility for
parole under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.”); State ex rel. Morgan v. Louisiana, 217
So. 3d 266, 277 (La. 2016) (finding a ninety-nine year sentence to be “the functional equivalent of”
a life sentence warranting an opportunity for release); State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1137 (Ohio
2016) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence that denies a juvenile some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”);
Poitra v. Wyoming, 368 P.3d 284, 290 (Wyo. 2016) (noting that “[t]he law has drawn a bright line
at the age of eighteen” before which there must be a “meaningful chance at parole,” but that the
defendant was over the age of eighteen when he committed the crime).
211. Ryan Grimes, Prosecutors Ignoring Supreme Court Call to Give Juvenile Lifers a New
Sentence, Says ACLU, MICH. RADIO (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/
prosecutors-ignoring-supreme-court-call-give-juvenile-lifers-new-sentence-says-aclu.
212. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25(9) (2018).
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statute directed prosecutors to pursue the maximum term.213
The jurisdictional transfer from juvenile to criminal court begins the
wrenching consequences for youth fighting against a powerful “tough on
crime” tide. The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Angilau, provided an
example of the standard reasoning applied in cases transferred without an
individualized judicial determination.214 The state court applied a rational
basis analysis to the substantive due process arguments, because in its
view, no fundamental right or interest arises when assigning adjudicatory
jurisdiction.215 The juvenile court system stands under legislative
authority, “and the legislature can choose to exclude certain minors from
that system so long as the exclusion is not arbitrary or impermissibly
discriminatory.”216 To these legal boundaries, the Utah court reasoned
that
[p]rotection of society from dangerous individuals is unquestionably a
legitimate government purpose, and potentially longer incarceration is
rationally related to that purpose. The qualifications regarding age and
severity of crime are not arbitrary, because they reasonably relate to the
degree of threat to society that an individual might pose. . . . Nor are
those qualifications discriminatory in ways objectionable under the
Utah or federal constitutions.217

The Utah Supreme Court toes a familiar analytical line in dispensing
with the procedural due process challenge. Narrowing the question to its
simplest deductive logic, the state supreme court reasoned that the
juvenile defendant “did not possess any initial statutory rights associated
with juvenile court protections and thus could not be deprived of rights
he never held.”218 The defendant’s pathway to criminal court in Utah sits
in direct contrast to the transfer statute reviewed in Kent v. United States,
wherein the juvenile court presumptively held jurisdiction in the first
instance.219

213. See People v. Skinner, 877 N.W.2d 482, (Mich. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d 918 N.W.2d 292
(Mich. 2018).
214. 245 P.3d 745 (Utah 2011).
215. Id. at 749 (quoting State v. Candedo, 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2010)) (“This court will uphold
a statute under the rational basis standard ‘if it has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and [is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.’”).
216. Id. (citing State ex rel. N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
217. Id. at 750.
218. Id. at 751 (“Because Mr. Angilau held no initial right (statutory or constitutional) to be
brought before a juvenile court, there was no need for a hearing before charging him in adult court.
The automatic waiver statute, therefore, does not violate procedural due process.”).
219. Compare Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (providing presumptive jurisdiction),
with Angilau, 245 P.3d at 751 (denying juvenile court protections).

248

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

This rational basis analysis clearly omits the “constitutionally
different” language considered in the juvenile sentencing trilogy, thus
showing how putting these pieces together has yet to take hold in the
transfer context.220 Moreover, the Utah court’s treatment of the
sentencing issue in the procedural due process realm calls into question
the fuller understanding of youth relied upon by the United States
Supreme Court. Consider the following passage:
Mr. Angilau argues he had a liberty interest at stake because of the
longer and harsher sentences available in adult criminal court, and
because of the possibility of being incarcerated in adult institutions. The
incarceration question is a distinct and separate issue, which we do not
address here, because it is not the subject of the automatic waiver
statute. The statute at issue controls jurisdiction but mentions nothing
regarding location or conditions of incarceration. As far as the “harsher”
sentences available in adult court are concerned, they do not implicate
a liberty interest for Mr. Angilau, because he was never entitled to
juvenile jurisdiction once he met the criteria in the automatic waiver
statute. One cannot hold an interest in something to which one was
never entitled.221

In this case, and in post-Miller cases, we see how this distinction
becomes untenable if the mantra that “children are constitutionally
different from adults” is to carry any weight to invoke continued reform.
B. The Progressive Movement Envisioned A Different Path
The government’s parens patriae authority grounds the juvenile
justice system in common law.222 It encompasses an obligation to protect
a child’s welfare.223 For the Progressive reformers who created the
juvenile justice system, rehabilitation meant a government obligation to
return juvenile offenders into society as fully functioning contributors.224
Advancements in psychiatry and psychology fueled the notion that
professionals could diagnose and cure deviant behavioral patterns in
children.225 The government also exercised its police power to serve
societal interests.226 The Progressive’s approach focused on the
220. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)).
221. Angilau, 245 P.3d at 750 (citations omitted) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-A-6-701 (West
2018); State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1005 (Utah 1995)).
222. See Tanenhaus, supra note 4, at 18; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 70.
223. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 69–70.
224. Id. at 93.
225. Id. at 87–88.
226. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality,
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individual offender, assuming society would receive residual benefits in
decreased juvenile crime rates and increased numbers of productive
citizens.227
The traditional juvenile court sought to reform delinquency on a lesser
scale than the crimes currently addressed through transfer to criminal
court and blended sentencing statutes.228 Juvenile incidents involving
murder, rape, and lethal violence did not present with the frequency seen
in modern society.229 In its original form, transfer to criminal court, when
approved through judicial process, served two pragmatic ends: (1) the
state’s obligation to protect both citizens and other incarcerated juveniles
from incorrigible defendants and (2) the recognition that not every child
will be amenable to rehabilitation.230 Early juvenile court proponents
frowned upon procedure and legal representation because the
proceedings were not meant to have an adversarial nature.231 Instead, the
court aimed to understand the act in question and provide a rehabilitative
prescription to prevent future transgressions.232
Over time, the court’s indeterminate sentencing power, cloaked under
individualized treatment motives, deteriorated into unpredictable
punitive detention terms.233 In re Gault exposed deficiencies of the
juvenile courts.234 If the courts randomly meted out punishment without
showing reformation in defendants, then the youth defendants deserved
procedural rights akin to their adult counterparts in criminal court.235 The
peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of police power to municipal affairs.”).
227. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 87 (explaining objectives).
228. CHAD R. TRULSON ET. AL, LOST CAUSES: BLENDED SENTENCING, SECOND CHANCES
AND THE TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION 17 (2016).
229. Id. (“More serious offenders—youthful murderers, rapists, and other violent youths—were
simply few and far between in those days, and were never the driving force in the development of
early juvenile institutions such as house of refuge or, for that matter, the juvenile court.”).
230. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 97 (noting the pragmatic effects of judicial
transfer).
231. Id. at 87.
232. Id. at 87–88.
233. “The rulings of the courts slowly began to abandon individualized treatment and
proportionality in juvenile punishment and instead began to resemble adult criminal courts with
penal sentences justified with parens patriae.” Lahny R. Silva, The Best Interest Is the Child: A
Historical Philosophy for Modern Issues, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 415, 424 (2014).
234. See BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 95–96.
235. Id. at 100–01 (“There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. . . . The Court also made it
clear it would view the juvenile justice system from a due process perspective. Thus, parens patriae
was dead . . . .”).
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In re Gault majority held that “the appearance as well as the actuality of
fairness . . . may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so
far as the juvenile is concerned.”236 With that, the parens patriae doctrine
lost its omniscience for justifying unbridled control over a youth’s fate.
For each right permitted adult offenders, the Supreme Court weighed it
against the purpose undergirding a separate juvenile court. For example,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania addressed the right to a jury trial.237 The Court
reasoned that the need for clear fact-finding in juvenile courts suffered no
harm when judges performed the task in lieu of juries.238
The Supreme Court granted youth a panoply of other procedural rights
to secure fundamental fairness in juvenile court proceedings.239 These
due process rights stabilized the ability to treat children differently from
adults while preserving the legal protections given anyone at risk of
losing their liberty to incarceration.240 Institutional growing pains led to
the import of rights borrowed from adults and scaled to children’s
prerogatives. This period brought necessary order to juvenile
adjudicatory proceedings. These cases also established juvenile traits that
transcend jurisdiction when applying constitutional criminal procedure.
Whereas social science provided an undercurrent to the Supreme Court’s
decisions, the Court has seemed more so guided by social science,
developmental psychology and neuroscience in its Eighth Amendment
pronouncements since Roper v. Simmons.241

236. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
237. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 530 (1971).
238. Id. at 545–46; BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 112.
239. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966) (affording juveniles due process
rights including the right to a hearing and to retain effective counsel); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S.
at 33–34, 55–56 (providing juveniles the right to notice of charges, confrontation of witnesses,
cross-examination, privilege against self-incrimination).
240. BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 103–04 (explaining that the Supreme Court
held that juveniles do not have to give up any legal protections in exchange for special care and
concerns).
241. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“A lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults . . . . [Therefore,
a] sentencer in a capital case must be allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in the
course of its deliberations over the appropriate sentence.”); but see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 378 (1989) (“The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eight Amendment; and in
that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not an available
weapon.”), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“[T]he Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability
should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.
The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation.”); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (holding youth to be a necessary mitigating factor in death
penalty cases, characterizing youth as “more than a chronological fact,” but as a “time and condition
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During the 1990s, public sentiment dictated that a juvenile committing
an adult act must serve an adult sentence because the offense’s severity
signified the juvenile’s maturity.242 Constitutional law now concedes
that, despite their transfer to criminal court, we still need to recognize that
youth offenders are not adults.243 This means more than just revamping
sentencing procedures at the most severe edges. States must review the
full justice process when transferring juveniles to the adult justice system.
These children are not “miniature adult” criminals; the Progressive era
reformers acknowledged this distinction and constitutional juvenile
sentencing cases affirm the distinction with evidence from social science,
developmental psychology, and neuroscience evidence.244 The Supreme
Court resurrected the legal differences due juvenile offenders after a long
stint in which politics controlled the narrative to reorganize the laws that
govern juvenile courts and transfer mechanisms of transfer to criminal
court.245 The Supreme Court tussled with advocates through the 1960s
and 1970s in calming the pendulum swing between constitutional rights
for juveniles in the justice system; the most recent sentencing opinions
open another frontier for rights discovery independent of understanding
this state created juvenile court system.246
IV. THE GATEKEEPERS TO CRIMINAL COURTS
Juvenile crimes fall on an expansive spectrum, ranging from petty theft
to heinous murders. The system deals with both extremes through
concrete policies. Minor offenses often fulfill the requirements for
diversionary programs in juvenile court. On the other end of the
spectrum, the Supreme Court provides guidance on how to sentence
juveniles who commit the most unconscionable crime of murder, which
cannot result in the death penalty or a mandatory sentence of life without
parole.247 A large swath of criminal behavior may be found between these
extremes. Transfer statutes display the struggle to adequately handle
these cases. The Supreme Court, in Graham v. Florida and Miller v.

of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage”).
242. BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 164.
243. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
244. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274–75 (2011).
245. See BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 144, at 182–84.
246. Id. at 182–83.
247. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (barring capital sentences for juveniles); Miller, 567
U.S. at 478 (finding mandatory life without parole sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders
unconstitutional).
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Alabama, addressed each theory of criminal punishment as it applied to
juvenile offenders.248 Whereas rehabilitation is a central goal for the
juvenile courts, transfer statutes inherently bring all four theories of
punishment to bear upon a juvenile offender.
A. The Gray Area: From Juvenile to Criminal Jurisdiction for
Unpredictable Youth
Transfer statutes unlock the criminal courts to young offenders.249
These statutes reveal inconsistencies in constitutional protections
afforded juvenile offenders, expose state resistance to Supreme Court
pronouncements, and mark the starting point for advocacy efforts.250
Many youth will eventually outgrow their criminal behaviors, no matter
how extreme their one-time tendency to violence or irreverence to
property rights.251 The rare juvenile delinquent who exhibits career
criminal antisocial behavior typically starts at a relatively young age with
multiple escalating contacts with law enforcement.252 Summarily, the
“hard” cases in this context involve older yet mentally immature
teenagers charged with criminal acts. Developing perfect policy solutions
proves difficult because maturity fluctuates from one adolescent to the
next, and maturity even varies from one trait to another for any given
individual.
Youth carted into the adult criminal justice system lose access to many
beneficial features unique to juvenile jurisdiction: most importantly, the
priorities of individualization and rehabilitation. States have expanded
transfer through legislation to exclude offenses from juvenile jurisdiction,
delegate transfer discretion to prosecutors, and permit blended
sentencing, all of which have encroached upon the historical role of
judges in making transfer decisions.253 Statutory exclusion continuously

248. See generally Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting juveniles from being sentenced to prison
for life without parole for non-homicide offenses); Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (prohibiting juveniles from
receiving mandatory life sentences without possibility of parole for homicides).
249. See GRIFFIN, ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (explaining various transfer mechanisms).
250. See supra notes 188–192 and accompanying text.
251. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOC.
RESEARCH, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, 1945–1963
(1999), available at www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/7729.
252. COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE & BOARD ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES,
JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE 66 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001), available at
https://www.nap.edu/read/9747/chapter/5 (“It has long been known that most adult criminals were
involved in delinquent behavior as children and adolescents; most delinquent children and
adolescents, however, do not grow up to be adult criminals.”).
253. Dawson, supra note 111, at 45.
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envelops larger portions of youth offenders as states lower their
jurisdictional age, add more crimes to the automatic transfer list, and
supplant age-offense criteria for “once an adult, always an adult”
jurisdictional rules.254
The transfer population represents a small percentage of youth in the
justice system.255 Beginning in 1994, cases transferred by judicial
discretion greatly decreased, in part because juvenile violent crime
declined and in part because prosecutorial discretion and automatic
waiver statutes replaced the former heavy reliance on judicial waiver.256
Although few states fully track transfer numbers, of those that do, those
states “that have only judicial waiver laws . . . [see] average transfer rates
[that] are generally lower than those in the remaining seven states, which
have statutory exclusion laws, prosecutorial discretion laws, or both.”257
Judicial waiver numbers give insight into this demographic. Just over
600,000 juveniles confront a formal waiver petition in the juvenile courts
annually.258 Of the cases that apply discretional judicial waiver,
approximately one percent of those who were sixteen years old and older
were transferred, while only 0.1% of juveniles who were age fifteen and
below were transferred from juvenile court.259 Black males over age
sixteen are removed from juvenile jurisdiction at a higher percentage than
their white peers.260 Violent offenses against a person result in transfer

254. Lydia E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra
note 4, at 181, 187 (“Under recent reforms of the transfer process, many states have enlarged the
category of cases for which criminal court jurisdiction is exclusive—by lowering the jurisdictional
age, expanding the category of serious charges triggering criminal court jurisdiction, or
supplementing age-offense criteria with criteria relating to the juvenile’s prior offense history.”).
See e.g. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(5) (2018).
255. “Less than a quarter of the cases reached criminal court via judicial waiver. More common
were exclusion cases (42%) and prosecutorial direct files (35%).” See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note
16, at 12.
256. Id. at 10.
257. Id. at 17–18.
258. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 2011 at 1 (2014), available at
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248410.pdf (“In 2011, U.S. Courts with juvenile jurisdiction handled
more than 1.2 million delinquency cases. More than half (54%) of these cases were handled
formally (i.e., a petition was filed requesting an adjudication or waiver hearing).”).
259. See SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2016 40 (2016) (“Cases involving juveniles age 16 or older
were much more likely to be judicially waived to criminal court than those involving younger
juveniles”).
260. Id.
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more often than property offenses.261 The judicial transfer numbers
greatly decreased after the mid-nineties, falling to around 5,400 in
2011.262 Experts attribute this trend in part due to the expansion of nonjudicial transfer statutes.263
A statutory transfer process begins the absolute deprivation for some
of their liberty interest. Under some circumstances, the defendant
receives an individualized assessment—but not always. After removal
from juvenile jurisdiction, trial courts need to focus on how youthfulness
affects fundamental fairness at other critical stages.
B. The Individualized process of Discretionary Judicial Waiver
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, juvenile court judges in most
states held the exclusive authority to make the transfer determinations for
youth defendants.264 Judicial waiver, unlike statutory exclusion and
prosecutorial direct file, requires a resource investment, both human
capital and financial. This burden emanates from the efforts needed to
prepare individualized files for the judge’s consideration. It entails a
collection of professionals investigating the offense, putting together a
report profiling the alleged offender, indulging a hearing, and fulfilling
proof requirements.265
Mandatory and presumptive judicial waiver laws chip away at judges’
ability to exercise discretion over transfer after conducting an
individualized assessment.266 Presumptive waiver places the burden on
defendants to persuade courts against transfer.267 Mandatory waiver
removes any subjective considerations, because the juvenile judge plays
only a ministerial role limited to deciding (1) whether the case comports
with statutory requirements, and (2) whether the state presents probable
cause for its charges.268 Prosecutorial direct file, another limit on judicial
waiver, occurs before an accused youth even steps foot in the
courtroom.269 On this front, the Kent Court provided a road map for lower

261. Id. at 39.
262. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 258, at 1 (stating that delinquency cases
peaked at 13,600 case in 1994 and decreased by 61 percent to 4,500 cases in 2011).
263. Id. at 1–2.
264. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 8.
265. Dawson, supra note 111, at 54–56.
266. Id. at 46.
267. Id. at 57.
268. Id. at 58, 65.
269. Id. at 53.
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courts in this effort.270
In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural
requirements for discretionary judicial waiver.271 The relevant transfer
statute required a “full investigation” of the circumstances for
transferring jurisdiction but set no standards for the court’s decision as to
waiver.272 The defense attorney had filed two motions: a motion for a
hearing on the waiver issue and petitioner’s psychiatric condition; and a
motion for access to the social services file developed during the
petitioner’s probation period.273 The juvenile court summarily
transferred the case to criminal jurisdiction without addressing the
motions, conferring with the petitioner’s attorney or parents, or recording
its factual findings or reasoning.274 The court considered three pieces of
information: staff recommendations, the social services file, and the
probation office’s report.275 The petitioner’s attorney did not gain access
to these documents.276 Kent eventually stood trial in the criminal system,
where the jury convicted him on all charges.277
On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted a single issue: “the infirmity
of the proceedings by which the Juvenile Court waived its otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction . . . .”278 The petitioner argued that there were
apparent process deficiencies—no hearing, no written reasons for
transfer, and no access to pertinent documents.279 The Supreme Court
expressed no concern with the juvenile court’s wide latitude to wield its
discretion in making the transfer decision, but it did take issue with the
court’s “arbitrary procedure.”280 The Court’s analysis centered on
procedural due process and fairness principles.281 The following excerpt
summarizes the Court’s thoughts on how procedural due process and
fundamental fairness apply when transferring someone from juvenile to
criminal jurisdiction:
270. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966).
271. Id. at 544.
272. Id. at 547.
273. Id. at 545–46.
274. Id. at 546.
275. Id. at 547.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 550.
278. Id. at 552.
279. Id.
280. “The statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion as to the factual
considerations to be evaluated, the weight to be given them and the conclusion to be reached. It
does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure.” Id. at 553.
281. Id.
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[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony—without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.
It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with
respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be
extraordinary if society’s special concern for children . . . permitted this
procedure. We hold that it does not.282

Following its procedural cautions, the Court moved on to set forth
reasons for its ruling, grounded in the original intentions behind creating
a juvenile system separate from criminal courts. 283 It explicitly
acknowledged that the juvenile justice system works on a different plane
from ordinary criminal law.284 As it did again in In re Gault, one year
later, the Court in Kent recognized that juvenile jurisdiction provided
specific protections that were not available once a juvenile was
transferred to criminal court.285 The Court considered these civil rights
on the same level as risking comparatively harsher punishments that may
be imposed once transferred to criminal court.286
In the end, the Court concluded that the juvenile judge should have
held a hearing, provided relevant documents to the petitioner’s attorney,
and developed a written record explaining its reasons to transfer
jurisdiction.287 The Court reasoned that this result was dictated not only
by the statute but also by “the context of constitutional principles relating
to due process and the assistance of counsel.”288 Despite Kent’s heinous
charges, including burglary and rape, the Court still held steadfast to the
thought that transfer to “adult criminal treatment” should be the
exception, not the rule, for those initially falling within juvenile

282. Id. at 554.
283. See id. at 554–56 (discussing the original theory and policy behind the jurisdiction’s
Juvenile Court Act).
284. “The theory of the District’s Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is rooted
in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris.” Id. at 554.
285. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (“[J]uveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures
applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal
due process”). For example, juvenile offenders enjoy limited anonymity, detention among other
youth as opposed to adult inmates, efforts at community reintegration, and, importantly, the ability
to retain certain civil rights such as voting and eligibility for public employment. Kent, 383 U.S. at
556–57.
286. “In these circumstances, . . . decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the matter
to the District Court was potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between five years’
confinement and a death sentence.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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jurisdiction.289
The Court suggested that individualized considerations overlap those
that bear on individualized sentencing determinations. The Kent
Appendix lists eight factors:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if
personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint . . . .
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are
adults . . . .
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile . . . .
8. The prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood
of reasonable rehabilitation . . . by the use of procedures, services and
facilities currently available . . . .290

Noticeably, the Kent factors reflect the themes expressed as policy
through the Miller holding developed five decades later.291 The
delineation between juvenile and criminal court systems rests in their
objectives: juvenile courts are to “provide measures of guidance and
rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal
responsibility, guilt and punishment. The state is parens patriae rather
than the prosecuting attorney and judge.”292 The Supreme Court affirmed
the appellate court’s priority that youth offenders should be tried in
juvenile courts as the rule and adult criminal courts as the exception, and
then only after an individualized assessment.293 Most states adopted the
Kent factors and its requirement of a hearing and written findings as the
constitutional guide for judges when exercising their discretion to transfer
289. “[I]t is implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal treatment is to be the
rule—and the adult criminal treatment, the exception which must be governed by the particular
factors of individual cases.” Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original) (quoting Harling v. United States,
295 F.2d 161, 164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
290. Id. at 566–67.
291. Compare id.; with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012).
292. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554–55.
293. Id. at 560–61.
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juveniles, grant a motion for reverse transfer, impose an adult sentence
when a juvenile sentencing option exists by law, or impose blended
sentences.294
Years before Roper v. Simmons, Lydia E. Frost Clausel and Richard I.
Bonnie argued that statutory exclusion combined with an individualized
assessment in criminal court may alleviate constitutional fundamental
fairness concerns.295 They pointed to a trend in appellate court opinions
expressing reservations about automatic transfer laws when there was no
standing without any reverse waiver provision in place.296 Criminal court
judges in jurisdictions with a reverse waiver provision hold a second
chance card: reverse judicial waiver permits transfer back from criminal
to juvenile jurisdiction for cases placed on the criminal docket through
direct file or statutory exclusion.297 Most states employ the Kent factors
as a guide for judges presented with these reverse waiver and blended
sentencing options.298 Yet reverse waiver statutes are an insufficient
countermeasure to the problems apparent with statutory exclusion and
prosecutorial discretion laws, though, because criminal court staff are illsourced to adequately investigate reverse waiver or juvenile sentencing
factors.299
Hughes v. Delaware illustrated the due process problem that transfer
statutes pose. In Hughes, the issue was whether a statute requiring that all
children charged with a felony to be automatically transferred from
family court to superior court without judicial investigation was
unconstitutional.300 The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the statute
294. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1128 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding district
court’s discretion to impose an increased adult sentence on juvenile without submitting penalty to
a jury); Flakes v. People, 153 P.3d 427, 430 (Colo. 2007) (holding that district court has discretion
on whether to impose blended sentence after direct file transfer to criminal court and remanded for
resentencing); Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 51–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding case-specific
findings of fact, including seriousness of offense, must be sufficient to support waiving juvenile
court jurisdiction); State v. Dixon, 967 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Vt. 2008) (remanding trial court’s denial
of motion for reverse transfer to juvenile jurisdiction as an abuse of discretion).
295. Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 190.
296. Id.
297. Dawson, supra note 111, at 50; Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 83, 100.
298. Feld, supra note 297, at 120.
299. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at
227, 242–43.
300. The amendment provided that “if a child reaches his eighteenth birthday prior to an
adjudication on a charge of delinquency arising from acts which would constitute a felony,” the
Family court must automatically transfer the matter to Superior Court. 69 Del. Laws 205 (1994).
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violated the constitutional guarantees of both due process and equal
protection under the law.301 First, the statute violated the constitutional
due process guarantees because it eliminated judicial review to assess the
basis, if any, for prosecuting a child as an adult.302 Second, the statute
violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law because
children unfairly charged with committing a felony, but ultimately
convicted of a misdemeanor, were accorded disparate treatment from
those children initially charged only with a misdemeanor.303 The Court
noted that the statute would be constitutional if it included a reverse
waiver provision.304
In In re Boot, the statute under consideration conferred exclusive
original jurisdiction over certain youthful offenders on the adult criminal
court without the benefit of a reverse transfer hearing. 305 The defendants
argued that the statute was unconstitutional on due process, equal
protection, and Eighth Amendment grounds.306 The Supreme Court of
Washington upheld the constitutionality of the statute.307 However, in a
concurring opinion, a justice of the court questioned whether the lack of
judicial authority to transfer the case back to juvenile court rendered this
statute unconstitutional as applied.308 In conclusion, frontline scholars
were correct when they cautiously surmised that “[t]hough the law is only
beginning to develop in this area, it appears that an opportunity for
individualization through a reverse waiver hearing may be a
constitutionally required safety valve in some situations.”309
The statute also alters the existing scheme by preventing the defendant from obtaining
judicial review of an important aspect of the amenability process. First, by mandating
that those offenders falling under its purview be automatically transferred to Superior
Court . . . . Moreover, the provision explicitly eliminates the reverse amenability process
in the Superior Court under section 1011 for those children transferred to that court for
trial as adults.
Hughes v. State of Delaware, 653 A.2d 241, 247 (Del. 1994).
301. Hughes, 653 A.2d at 252.
302. “Independent judicial review to assess the basis for prosecuting a child as an adult is a
‘prerequisite for sustaining the constitutionality of the Delaware statutory framework.’” Id. at 250
(quoting Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Del. 1993)).
303. Id. at 252.
304. Id.
305. In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 969 (Wash. 1996).
306. Id. at 966, 972.
307. Id. at 966–67.
308. Id. at 977 (Alexander, J., concurring) (citing Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241 (Del. 1994))
(“[W]hile in the abstract such restraints exist, there is no provision in this statute for a judicial
proceeding where the prosecutor's discretion is tested. Although I will presume good faith on the
part of the charging authority, that is not sufficient to protect a child’s constitutional rights.”).
309. Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 192.
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C. Tough on Crime: Transfer Without Individualized Assessment
Transfer to criminal court precedes harsh punishments and, for
juveniles, deprivation of rights in the justice process.310 When
questioning whether juveniles have a right to avoid that transfer, we must
note that juvenile courts draw their authority solely from legislative
grants of jurisdiction. This may empower the legislature to define
jurisdictional boundaries, removing the argument that youth have a right
to be tried in the juvenile courts. But this fact does not usurp the right for
an individualized assessment at critical points within the justice process.
Statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct file forgo altogether or
shroud in opacity any individual assessment of a youth’s character,
background, and the circumstances surrounding the offense. Statutory
exclusion policies displace juveniles to the criminal courts based on their
offense category, chronological age, and, at times, their criminal
history.311 Those policies also allow prosecutors to manipulate the
charged offense, permitting them limited discretion under this pathway
to transferring youth.312 Some prosecutors share concurrent jurisdiction
between the juvenile and criminal courts and may direct file in either
jurisdiction.313 Prosecutors may or may not consider juveniles’
individualized traits, but if they do, this consideration is devoid of
transparency or accountability.314
Transfer laws come in three varieties. Twenty-nine states use statutory
exclusion laws and automatic transfer statutes to initiate a case against a
juvenile in criminal court or to immediately transfer a case from juvenile
to criminal court based on the defendant’s age, the crime committed, and
sometimes the juvenile’s previous record.315 Forty-five states and the
District of Columbia allow juvenile judges to transfer a case to the
criminal court in response to the prosecution’s motion.316 Finally,
fourteen states and the District of Columbia permit prosecutors to direct
file charges against a juvenile in criminal court.317 Every state employs
310. Feld, supra note 297, at 83.
311. See Dawson, supra note 111, at 66 (adding that these categories reflect legislative judgment
that these are the only criteria which are suitable to make the sorting decision and providing
statutory examples of each).
312. Feld, supra note 297, at 98.
313. Id.
314. See Dawson, supra note 111, at 53 (stating that prosecutorial selection for judicial waiver
decisions lack “prior or concurrent procedures” and that “[n]egative decisions are not subject to
review”).
315. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
316. Id. at 2.
317. Id. at 3.
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at least one of these three transfer laws.318 In addition, twenty-five states
permit reverse waiver, wherein a criminal court judge can return a
defendant to juvenile court or apply juvenile sentencing principles.319
Other states also implement statutes mandating that after a juvenile has
been transferred from juvenile jurisdiction to criminal court, all
subsequent charges must be tried in criminal court.320 Additionally,
blended sentencing provisions play into the sentencing options for
juveniles that commit more serious crimes.
Of all the transfer mechanisms, prosecutorial discretion presents the
greatest concern. Summarily, “[d]iscretionary prosecutorial waiver
supplants the juvenile court system processes that were historically
designed to treat each child individually like a child.” 321 In some states,
prosecutors can transfer any case to criminal court based solely on a
juvenile’s age.322 Other states limit prosecutorial transfer to certain
serious crimes, but even then, prosecutors need not provide an
explanation for their decisions.323 Statutory exclusion statutes are by no
means a suitable alternative, but at least they remove the perception of
bias and inappropriate exercises of authority. Notably, prosecutors
employ both mechanisms sans a judicial hearing or producing a formal
record. Both prosecutorial discretion and statutory exclusion transfer
mechanisms prohibit participation from judges, defendants, and their
legal representatives.
Again, the argument runs that youth offenders do not hold an inherent
right to remain within the juvenile court jurisdiction because state
legislatures created these courts.324 Accordingly, state legislatures may
constitutionally define access to juvenile jurisdiction as they see fit so
318. Id. at 2.
319. RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN
EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 2 (2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/220595.pdf.
320. GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
321. Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests
Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110
PENN. ST. L. REV. 233, 280 (2005).
322. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-276(1), 29-1816(1)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2018) (requiring
consideration of circumstances in exercising prosecutorial discretion while limiting prosecutorial
discretion to juveniles over fourteen years old accused of a felony or traffic violation); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-6-203(f) (2018) (mandating certain factors that the prosecutor must consider while
limiting prosecutorial discretion for felony cases to those over the age of seventeen and violent
felony cases to where the minor is over fourteen years old).
323. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 20.
324. See generally Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bland,
472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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long as their transfer rules are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
classifications.325 The following excerpt from Colorado’s Supreme Court
represents this justification:
It is clear that the General Assembly intended to exclude certain
offenders from the juvenile court system by defining certain serious
offenses as per se criminal and properly within the constitutional
jurisdiction of the district court even if committed by a juvenile over the
age of 14. This is not unreasonable in light of the apparent legislative
decision that certain repeat offenders, or those who have committed
serious offenses, should be separated from those juveniles who
perpetrate relatively less serious or less violent crimes and who, in the
view of the legislature, are more likely candidates for rehabilitation.326

Statutory exclusion does a haphazard job of combining age and
charged offense to render transfer determinations.327 These laws cast a
monolithic net intended to gather “irredeemable” youth based on offense
severity and chronological age. These populations show great diversity
in terms of maturity, sophistication, and amenability to rehabilitation—
leading to overbreadth of transfers to criminal court and misalignment
with the legislative and institutional goals that are appropriate for this age
group.328
State supreme courts overwhelmingly characterize jurisdictional
waiver as a purely procedural matter working independently of equal
protection and Eighth Amendment concerns, both because (1) again,
juvenile courts are a state legislative creation and (2) attendant
constitutional rights are present whether a youth is tried in a juvenile or
criminal court. The due process argument concludes that “the character
of the proceeding,” not its “consequences to the accused,” is
determinative when reviewing the level of procedural protections that are
owed to alleged offenders.329 These courts characterize the limited reach
of Kent as not speaking to transfer mechanisms in toto, but only to
discretionary judicial waiver.330 Moreover, Kent does little to describe
325. Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is no
inherent right to be treated as a juvenile and thus state legislatures may restrict when accuseds are
treated as juveniles); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. 1982) (affirming prosecutorial
discretion without mandatory judicial hearing in the absence of suspect factors); State v. Berard,
401 A.2d 448, 453 (R.I. 1979) (holding that statutory exclusion is a “reasonable and rational
classification and that it violates neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
326. Thorpe, 641 P.2d at 940.
327. See, e.g., State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661–62 (Conn. 1998).
328. Feld, supra note 297, at 118; Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 188.
329. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973).
330. Clausel and Bonnie write that “[i]t must be emphasized, however, that Kent is better seen
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the evidence needed to cross over a youth into criminal jurisdiction. In
summation, under current systems, no one stands accountable or draws
scrutiny for transfer decisions, not even judges in most states.331
The separation of powers doctrine shelters prosecutorial discretion, an
executive branch function, from court oversight, excepting arbitrary
classifications based on race and religion; though age and offense would
not qualify.332 In United States v. Bland, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia offered an influential opinion on the
constitutionality of that prosecutorial discretion.333 The federal statute at
issue excluded from juvenile jurisdiction “those 16 and older charged by
the United States attorney with murder, forcible rape, robbery while
armed, burglary in the first degree, or assault with intent to commit one
of these offenses, or any such offense and a properly joinable offense.”334
The defendant argued that the provision violated his right to due
process.335 According to the court, prosecutorial discretion only requires
review under allegations that disparate treatment between charging
decisions was based on “race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification[s].”336
Judge Skelly Wright penned a dissent that focused on the
indistinguishable consequences flowing from the waiver decision
regardless of the transfer mechanism. He noted that the procedural
protections due to the defendant remain the same, regardless of whether
a judge waived the defendant into criminal court or a prosecutor brought
the defendant there initially.337 He defined the issue as “not whether the
prosecutor should be permitted to make waiver decisions, but rather how
he should go about making those decisions.”338 The prosecutor’s
as a procedural due-process decision because the Supreme Court said nothing to question the
fundamentally discretionary character of the decision and did not prescribe any substantive
criteria.” Clausel & Bonnie, supra note 254, at 184.
331. Thus, the overall picture is that transfer is outside the reach of the rule of law. The decision
whether a youth should be treated as a juvenile or an adult lies within the virtually
unreviewable discretion of legislators (who draw unreviewable classifications based on age,
offense, and perhaps offense history), prosecutors (who need give no reasons at all), or
judges (who must give a reason compatible with whatever the legislature has prescribed in
the statute).
Id. at 198.
332. Id. at 192–97.
333. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
334. Id. at 1333 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1303, at 226 (1970)).
335. Id. at 1331.
336. Id. at 1336 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962)).
337. Id. at 1342–50 (Wright, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 1342.
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partisanship earned him an additional layer of skepticism addressed by
the Kent hearing requirements.339 And Judge Wright’s dissenting opinion
lends no analytical value to the “dubious vestiture-divestiture distinction”
used by the majority opinion; instead, the dispositive facts rest in the
different treatment given children in juvenile courts as compared to
criminal courts.340 And so, because “the consequences to the child are
precisely the same[,] . . . the procedural protections should be
identical.”341 Due process inheres to the individual, yet the prescription
varies based on the offender’s age, notwithstanding the accessibility of
juvenile jurisdiction for minors.342
One dramatic point that Judge Wright dealt with was that the
prosecutor’s waiver decision removes the consideration of the offender’s
juvenile status from the equation after removal to criminal court and that
this decision is “largely unreviewable.”343 For this reason, “it is
especially vital that the procedures be fair at the one point in the criminal
process where these matters are considered.”344 Judge Wright
characterized the juvenile judicial system as “another system of justice
with different procedures, a different penalty structure, and a different
philosophy of rehabilitation.”345 Although given limited legal import,
Judge Wright addressed the dilemma that despite the inability to predict
an offender’s rehabilitative potential, stowing juveniles away in adult
facilities almost guarantees their unwanted exposure to harmful
conditions and influences.346
Juvenile defendants argue against prosecutorial discretion on the
grounds that it occurs without a hearing and that it encroaches upon the
judiciary’s authority to sentence convicted defendants. This power to levy
charges falls within the traditional functions of the executive branch
339. Id. at 1343–44 (referencing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)).
340. Id. at 1343.
341. Thus the United States Attorney’s charge acts to divest the Juvenile Court of its preexisting exclusive jurisdiction in precisely the same manner as does the juvenile judge’s
waiver decision. Since the divestiture is the same, the procedural rights accompanying it
should be the same, and we need look no farther than Kent to determine what those rights
are.
Id. at 1343, 1344.
342. “It should be clear, then, that the test for when the Constitution demands a hearing depends
not on which government official makes the decision, but rather on the importance of that decision
to the individual affected.” Id. at 1345.
343. Id. at 1348.
344. Id.
345. Id. (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1971); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 557 (1968)).
346. Id. at 1349–50.
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through prosecutorial discretion.347 In Cox v. United States, the Fourth
Circuit observed that while the consequences of judicial and prosecutorial
waiver may be identical from a defendant’s perspective, the constitutional
analysis depends on the decision maker.348 As far as constitutional due
process protections, the hearing requirement applies only to judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings, not prosecutorial decisions.349 Many states
followed the Cox approach to uphold the constitutionality of their state
legislatures’ delegation of authority over the transfer decision from
juvenile to adult court to prosecutors. Notably, in these analyses, the court
focuses on “the character of the proceeding, rather than its consequences
to the accused, [as] largely determinative of his rights.” 350 The
prosecutor’s discretion also falls under the umbrella of executive power
and thus sits apart from judicial requirements without a legislative
grant.351
The Court’s opinion in Roper v. Simmons reinvigorated the state’s role
in protecting children beyond juvenile jurisdiction and into the criminal
court context.352 The three common transfer mechanisms all have unique
challenges directly related to whether each weighs in earnest a juvenile
offender’s youthful traits. For example, prosecutorial direct file takes
place in a cloaked space with no accountability from an adversarial
hearing or judicial review. New Jersey enacted a law to address this
problem by requiring that prosecutors provide written reasons for seeking
transfer to criminal court and receive judicial approval for that request.353
Another criticism targets discretionary judicial review. Specifically, the
trial court’s transfer decision receives a perfunctory review, if at all, only
after the defendant’s conviction and sentencing. Texas remains one of a
few states that allows transfer solely through discretionary judicial
waiver.354 The Texas legislature passed a law granting transferred youth
the right to appeal a transfer decision before their final judgment and
347. Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1216–17 (8th Cir. 1976).
348. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973).
349. Id.
350. Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss. 1975).
351. Russell, 543 F.2d at 1216–17.
352. [N]otwithstanding the societal response, the historical goals upon which the juvenile
court system was established must still function today in concert with the doctrine of parens
patriae. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper “awakens” the sleeping doctrine of parens
patriae by reiterating some of the very same observations regarding differences between
adults and youth that originally motivated the establishment of the juvenile court system.
Green, supra note 321, at 265.
353. In re V.A., 50 A.3d 610, 616 (N.J. 2012).
354. See State-by-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190.
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tasking the state supreme court to implement procedures for an expedited
decision on those appeals.355
As reviewed in detail above, the Kent factors ask judges to review three
categories of evidence: the offense, the defendant, and institutional
concerns.356 The Kent factors also arise in the criminal context for reverse
waiver, blended sentencing, and youthful offender sentencing
determinations. Statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct file seem to
be the only fateful determinations in this process that escape any
requirement for individualized assessment requirements.
Collectively, pursuant to Kent and the juvenile sentencing trilogy, the
Supreme Court has cultivated an unenumerated constitutional right that
is available to juvenile offenders independent of attendant procedures.357
The line between procedural and substantive rights appears blurred under
due process holdings. State supreme court cases analyzing statutory
exclusion and prosecutorial discretion determine that a juvenile’s
procedural rights are preserved because juvenile courts exercise
jurisdiction only to the extent granted under state legislative authority,
such that transfer to criminal court does not deprive the juvenile
defendant of any constitutional criminal procedure rights. This analysis
wholly overlooks the thrust behind the argument that “children are
different” and the philosophical and expert justifications underpinning
juvenile courts and the more recent sentencing opinions.
Roper, Graham, and Miller, along with the subsequent case of
Montgomery v. Louisiana, which made Miller applicable, prompted the
resentencing of juveniles then serving sentences of life without parole.358
The strength of the movement ignited as a result of these doctrinal shifts
cannot be understated. Most germane to this Article, the juvenile
sentencing trilogy forced courts and legislatures to view juvenile
behavior through the redemptive lens of expert researcher. The courts
must balance an individual’s background against the severity of his crime
when imposing sentences. The Supreme Court’s mandates continue to
reinvigorate, strengthen, and define the penological goal of juvenile
rehabilitation though state-level decision makers register this pursuit to
varying degrees. Additionally, in some states, these cases provided
persuasive legal footing to argue for raising the minimum criminal court
355. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01 (West 2017).
356. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966); Dawson, supra note 111, at 56–57.
357. Kent, 383 U.S. 541; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
358. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75; Miller, 567 U.S. at 478; Montgomery
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
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jurisdictional age.359
The Supreme Court’s constitutional reforms were met with mixed
reactions from state courts, legislatures, and executive branches. For
example, some state courts embraced the chance to resentence juveniles
serving life-without-parole sentences.360 They provided a meaningful
opportunity for release into the community. Other state courts and
executive branches, pursuant to Montgomery, ensured that these juveniles
would receive mandated rehearings but used them to impose even
lengthier sentences with parole.361 These defendants will receive nothing
less than their original life-without-parole sentence. Yes, advocates
enjoyed some success in changing maximum jurisdictional age
statutes.362 But juvenile transfer laws, the most common gateway to
lengthy sentences, remain widely unyielding to litigation and unnoticed
through the political process.
Eighth Amendment and due process arguments do not fully resolve the
more nuanced issues associated with juvenile offenders transferred to
criminal courts. Some scholars argue that Graham created a right to
rehabilitation via its holding that juveniles committing a non-homicide
offense should be given a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”363 But there does not
seem to be much detail about achieving rehabilitation for this
population.364 The Eighth Amendment argument runs into the doctrinal
hurdle of characterizing transfer as punishment.365 We know there are
many adverse consequences absent from juvenile courts that threaten
youth who are transferred to criminal jurisdiction. All roads, however,
lead to the conclusion that juveniles are constitutionally different from
adults; and even the transfer and sentencing stages incompletely identify
the need to compensate for youthfulness traits throughout the entire
justice process. A permeating substantive due process right based on age
status and its attendant disadvantages in achieving fundamental fairness
359. See supra text accompanying notes 166–167 (explaining the successes of raise-the-age
campaigns).
360. Pishko, supra note 207.
361. Id.
362. See supra notes 166–167.
363. Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L.
REV. 99, 100, 124 (2010) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
364. “In the end, the Court does not specifically explain what type of rehabilitation is required
for youth, rather Justice Kennedy declares that ‘[i]t is for legislatures to determine what
rehabilitative techniques are appropriate and effective.’” Id. at 128 (alteration in original) (quoting
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73–74).
365. Id. at 138.
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at certain stages of the justice process seems aligned with fully
interpreting the juvenile sentencing cases.
CONCLUSION
The statutory web spun by the states leaves a constitutionally
vulnerable hatch wherein youth can matriculate through the justice
process without receiving an individualized assessment at any stage.
Even though jurisdictions retain every right to weigh these youthfulness
traits to varying degrees, more than a dozen states give no credence to
constitutional distinctions between juveniles and their adult counterparts
once those juveniles are brought into the criminal justice process.366
Beginning in the eighties, state policymakers spasmodically built
elaborate legislative schemes to account for juvenile offenders. States
employ three common mechanisms to transfer juveniles to criminal court
without an individualized assessment: mandatory juvenile transfer,
statutory exclusion, and prosecutorial direct file.367 Once in criminal
court, even fewer states present the opportunity for a juvenile to backtrack
via reverse waiver or criminal blended sentencing.368 Finally, many states
automatically bring any subsequent charges in criminal court pursuant to
“once an adult, always an adult” policies.369 Whether knowingly or
unwittingly, these statutory pathways intersect in a manner at odds with
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that children are, indeed, different
from adults.370
Juvenile jurisdiction imbues an acceptance of children being different,
yet policymakers driven by social influence equivocate on executing and
prioritizing retribution against rehabilitative goals.371 Juvenile courts are
moored to constitutional principles through the fundamental fairness
guaranteed by due process. Before the sea change initiated by the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper v. Simmons, state supreme courts
were beginning to question the constitutionality of dropping juveniles
into the criminal system without contemplating their age at any point in
the justice process.372 Now, social science, developmental psychology,
366. See Juvenile Court, Intake and Diversion 2016, supra note 153.
367. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 16.
368. See State-By-State Summary of Transfer Laws, supra note 190.
369. See id.
370. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
371. See supra notes 159–175.
372. State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1998); In re Boot, 925 P.2d 964, 976–79 (Wash.
1996) (Alexander, J., concurring); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1209 (Del. 1992).
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and neuroscience all demonstrate that youth are immature, susceptible to
external stressors, and transitory.373 These traits, especially in
combination, have led the Supreme Court to conclude that children
possess a diminished culpability and can experience rehabilitation.
The Supreme Court has sought to protect juveniles in the criminal
context through categorical bans and the procedural requirement of
individualized assessment.374 But these restrictions apply only to the
harshest penalties: death and life without parole.375 The Court’s analyses
of these penalties discount the retributive goal, emphasize rehabilitation,
dismiss incapacitation, and express skepticism toward their deterrent
value. Currently, we see state supreme courts deliberating in earnest how
to reconcile mandatory minimum sentences with the Court’s more recent
pronouncements. Myriad state legislative responses to the Miller and
Montgomery resentencing project also serve as a litmus test of both
resistant and changing attitudes toward juvenile sentencing.
At this point, children possess a permeating right in the form of
individualized assessment, a right that places affirmative duties on state
actors. The norm that “children are constitutionally different from adults”
stands as a transferable observation that manifests to meet fundamental
fairness goals.376 Similar to the Sixth Amendment’s “critical stages” in
the justice process, the ever-growing knowledge of youthfulness makes
it incumbent on the criminal justice system to identify when children are
susceptible to their inherent deficiencies.377 Thus far, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged these traits when applying the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments. This must somehow translate further into the law.
Alternate approaches have arisen to cure this problem. For example,
every arrested youth should enter the justice process through the juvenile
courts with a presumption against transfer to criminal court. If transferred
to criminal court, an individualized assessment must be the procedural
hurdle to transfer, whether initiated by the court or via a transparent
prosecutorial motion for jurisdictional change. States could eliminate
mandatory sentencing and require trial courts to conduct an
individualized assessment before sentencing juvenile offenders. A more
fulsome option would be to identify critical stages throughout the justice
373. See supra note 2.
374. Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
375. See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (banning mandatory life without parole sentences for
juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without parole sentences for non-homicide
offenses); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (barring the death penalty for juveniles).
376. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551;
Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Miller, 567 U.S. 470).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89.
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process, those that require explicit consideration of how youthfulness
traits affect courts’ treatment of juveniles being tried in adult courts.
Legal commentators present cogent arguments supporting rehabilitation
as a requisite component to incarcerating juveniles. On the other hand, in
some states, individualism for sentences less than life without parole
proves nonexistent. Jurisdictions operating a justice process with the
constitutionally vulnerable space described above sentence juveniles “in
the same manner as adults.” This practice conflicts with the nowuniversal norm: children are different.

